




The German Tribune

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Bonn looks to intensify its links with New Delhi

The five-day state visit by India's President, Ramaswamy Venkataraman, is the first by a New Delhi head of state to Germany. Germany is one of India's most important trading partners. Over the past few years, commercial and economic links have increased a lot. Klaus Natorp looks at the background to the visit for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and observes that, despite the improved ties, both government and business in Germany have been slow to develop connections with India.

The state visit by the President of India, Ramaswamy Venkataraman, presents an opportunity of reappraising relations between Bonn and New Delhi.

Indo-German relations are good, but they could be better, and both sides have good reason to wonder why this is the case.

The German Federal government will readily realise that it is mainly up to Bonn to take a long and self-critical look at itself.

Incomprehensibly and annoyingly, it long paid China too much attention and India too little.

Scores of West German visitors have flown to Peking and toured the Chinese provinces. Politicians, businessmen, artists – everyone wanted to, felt they simply must pay China at least one visit.

China exercised a magnetic attraction. Its leaders were admired like miraculous animals. Their dictatorial, at best authoritarian, rule and the human rights violations for which they were to blame were generously overlooked.

India in contrast tended to be at the receiving end of sympathic smiles. Its endeavours to make democratic headway earned scant acknowledgment. Many China travellers had nothing but contempt for "the world's largest democracy."

India was felt to be a bottomless pit, a hopeless case with its bitterly poor masses.

There has been no lack of criticism of this superficial viewpoint and of warnings not to upset the balance of German interests in Asia. But, sad to say, they long went unheeded.

The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* has more than once called in vain for India to be brought more to the centre of German policy in Asia.

Did it not make sense to maintain close ties with a country and a government that were committed to the same democratic principles as we are?

Did not an India that was largely geared to market economics have better long-term prospects, despite the overwhelming poverty of part of its population, than China with its inflexible planned economy?

A mere glance at the enormous potential of skilled engineers trained in India ought to have attracted investors.

The Federal government and the German business community long held a different view. They were slow to appreciate that they had backed the wrong horse in Asia, both politically and economically.

The wave of enthusiasm about China has given way to a wave of disappointment. Growing economic difficulties and the blood shed when the Chinese democracy movement was put down by force in June will have opened the eyes of even the staunchest China supporters keen to disregard the communist character of the Peking regime.

That doesn't yet make them supporters of India, of course. But maybe they are now at least prepared to take an unprejudiced look at India, to do India justice and to acknowledge it for what it is: a major regional power that may one day emerge as a great power. Not today or tomorrow but maybe the day after.

It must be in the German interest to maintain cordial relations with a country of this kind, and the same is true of the Indian economy.

India is not just a developing country; it is, at the same time, an up-and-coming modern industrial state that is worth cooperating with.

Others, Japan in particular, have long appreciated the point. So has the United States.

Both have established a substantial lead in opening up new markets in India and in setting up a network of cooperation in electronics, especially computer software, which the Indians seem to be particularly skilled at developing.

German industry will have a tough task catching up with America and Japan, but it may not be too late to make good a little of the lost ground.

Chancellor Kohl has tried harder than his predecessors to make it clear to the government of India that the Federal Republic is interested in more intensive ties in all sectors.

Several meetings with Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi have testified to this endeavour, but the results have so far been modest. The follow-up has been strictly limited.

Personal ties of this kind need to be nursed, and both sides are to blame for failing to do so.

An honest self-appraisal in New Delhi would lead to the conclusion that India bears partial responsibility for the not entirely satisfactory state of Indo-German relations.

The Indians should have no difficulty in finding out where they have gone wrong over the years. Cumbersome Indian bureaucracy has made life difficult for German investors. Indians are often difficult political partners too.

They would do well to note that their leading politicians and diplomats have a reputation nearly all over the world for being arrogant wiseacres.

Do they really believe they never put a foot wrong or do they merely not want to admit that they too can make mistakes?

Even a little less complacency would make them much easier to get on with.

Klaus Natorp

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 September 1989)



India's President, Ramaswamy Venkataraman (left) welcomed to Bonn by President Richard von Weizsäcker. (Photo: dpa)

IN THIS ISSUE



Operation Namibia

The first German military force ever to take part in a United Nations peacekeeping exercise is the German Border Police in Namibia. Here, three members of the 50-strong contingent, headed by senior police officer Detlef Buwitt (centre) keep up with the news. (Photo: dpa)

■ INTERNATIONAL

How Austria's role in exodus to the West affects its status in Europe



East Berlin has so far tacitly tolerated the help Austria has given East German refugees in their exodus to the Federal Republic via Hungary.

The East Germans have protested loudly against the behaviour of Budapest and Bonn but not against Vienna.

Austrian Foreign Ministry officials say East Berlin must know that protest would have no effect in Vienna.

The East Berlin government is out on a limb and doesn't want to impose a burden on its relations with Vienna — especially as Austria is on good terms with most East European countries.

Bonn has rightly and repeatedly thanked Austria for its attitude toward the East German refugees.

Attention must naturally focus on the courageous, historically significant decision by the Hungarian authorities to allow East Germans to cross the border to the West.

But this humanitarian gesture would have been to no effect had it not been for the active participation of neutral Austria.

Who knows what Budapest would have decided if Austria, highly appreciated and badly needed for access to Europe, had not agreed to cooperate.

In view of the humanitarian approach neutral Austria has adopted towards waves of refugees in past decades, the West has come to take it for granted. But it isn't a matter of course.

For Vienna the international attention the exodus of East German refugees via Hungary and Austria has commanded for weeks comes at a convenient political juncture.

The Austrians have shown yet again, at a time when they are applying to join the European Community, how important and useful their neutral little country that sees itself as part of the West and behaves accordingly can be.

Its role can be particularly important and useful in the present phase of international affairs, a phase marked by major change in the communist camp.

A further factor in Vienna's favour is that the influx of East German refugees from Hungary and their immediate transit to the Federal Republic, a European Community country, takes much of the wind out of the sails of those in Brussels who take a dim view of Austria's open borders to the east.

Austria's surroundings have undergone a substantial change in the past year. The East used to be "predictable" from Vienna's point of view, and neighbourly relations were relatively quiet, despite the many difficulties.

No-one now knows where developments are heading. "We in Austria have every interest in seeing the reformers prevail in Eastern Europe and change take its course," Austria's Foreign Minister, Alois Mock, recently told a conference of ambassadors in Vienna.

But there must be no illusions that democracy was "just around the corner" and that there would be no more setbacks. "The reform process is in no way irreversible," he warned.

In most East Bloc states reforms, inasmuch as they were implemented, served the purpose of keeping the present leaders in power.

They were envisaged because the system of economic planning had been a failure and not on account of lofty democratic objectives of any kind.

If economic reforms failed to live up to the expectations placed in them by people in these countries, the disappointment would dash hopes of and strength for political change, he said.

Everything now depended on the West swiftly and generously helping forces prepared to embark on reform in Eastern Europe.


Austria noted with dismay that Herr Mock's proposal, made at the June Efta conference, for the Western industrialised world to raise $6bn in loans to Eastern European countries willing to embark on reform had not met with a positive response in a single country.

For Austria, developments in neighbouring countries to the east are not necessarily harmless. Austria's status, between East and West, must undergo a reappraisal.

Despite the enormous risks faced in Eastern Europe, Foreign Ministry officials in Vienna refer to them as a "positive instability" that is full of enormous opportunity.

Austria would be delighted to emerge from its peripheral position on a dead border with the East, but many Austrians are worried lest their country, neutral and left to its own devices, might be caught in a maelstrom of uncontrollable developments.

When US politicians such as Henry Kissinger or Lawrence Eagleburger then say Austria ought now to take the lead on behalf of states that are no longer communist but not yet Western, Austrian officials' hair stands on end.



(Cartoon: Mitropoulos/FAZ)

Austria, says a senior Foreign Ministry official, Thomas Klestil, is a Western democracy and cannot be assigned to the grey zone between East and West that is now taking shape on the Soviet Union's borders as a consequence of the collapse of communist power structures.

Austrians are said to see their future not as a crystallisation point for countries keen to part company with communism. That would be to forfeit their own way of life.

Several Eastern European countries might feel that Austria's present position would be their own best bet as a long-term political objective. Vienna has no objection to them holding this view.

But Austria does not want to mark time. It hopes to be a member of the European Community in five years' time, Dr Klestil says.

The latest developments in Eastern Europe have calmed down the Viennese intellectuals arguably headed by Education and Science Minister Erhard Busek.

In recent years and in some cases they have had enthusiastic visions of a revival of Central Europe as a political force with Vienna as its focal point.

Germany, incidentally, is not included in Central Europe as thus envisaged, unlike Poland.

Dr Busek, who has long nursed intensive ties with members of the Opposition in Eastern Europe, can fairly claim that they have shown interest in political visions of this kind.

Yet now the idea of an independent belt of Central European countries between the European Community and the Soviet Union no longer seems so unrealistic, Austria is keen not to be harnessed to the bandwaggon and would certainly not like to take the lead.

The Austrians know how much political dynamite there is in the region. In addition to the legacy of communism in collapse, all Austro-Hungarian successor states have mutual border, minority and other disputes that could easily lead to regional conflict if there were no hegemonial power to keep them in order.

So it is a mystery why Austria is now in the throes of a domestic, election campaign debate on reducing the equipment of Austria's armed forces, the Bundesheer.

Yugoslavia, for instance, is a particularly crisis-prone neighbour, and its very unity is at stake.

In Slovenia, the Yugoslav republic bordering on Austria, reformers are openly toying with the idea of an economic union with Austria, which is unenthusiastic, not least for fear of jeopardising its neutrality.

"We are keen to see Yugoslavia cope with its difficulties," Foreign Minister Mock says. But Austria feels the disputes within Yugoslavia are so serious that contingency plans have been drawn up should clashes occur there.

The Austrians are prepared to use their traditionally good relations with Eastern Europe to help reformers there.

Their offers of assistance range from advice and information to economic aid, including joint ventures, management training and converting loans into equity participation.

Poland, for instance, owes Austria over 40 billion schillings, or nearly DM6bn.

Other ideas include championing Eastern European causes at international bodies, close intergovernmental cooperation on the world expo planned to be held jointly in Vienna and Budapest in 1995 and a further extension of cultural cooperation.

Hanni Konitzer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 14 September 1989)

East Berlin has to plug the hole itself

WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE

If the GDR is to solve its crisis it must do something so its people want to stay instead of voting with their feet by going West.

That must include an opportunity of leaving the country when they want.

The Hungarians seem to have provided them with this opportunity. They are evidently determined not to close their border with Austria.

If the East German leaders want to plug the loophole that enables GDR citizens to make their getaway, they must plug it themselves.

Maybe they have already missed the opportunity. With Herr Honecker ill and his possible successors at odds, decisions are shelved.

The Soviet leader will shortly be visiting the GDR for its 40th anniversary celebrations. The GDR leaders are unlikely to want him to be given an even more enthusiastic reception, which would inevitably be the case if they were no longer allowed to visit Hungary.

The opportunity of leaving the GDR via Hungary could in fact be the beginning of a return to normal.

Once there were signs of change, the thousands who want to leave the country could become hundreds, or even fewer, again.

A leadership open to reasonable arguments ought to welcome the hand held out to it by the Churches and by other forces of reform.

What is special about the GDR Opposition is that it has done anything but call for a sellout of the state.

It has appealed to people to stay, appealed to their conscience and sense of duty not to leave their fellow-countrymen in the GDR in the lurch.

An alliance could readily be forged if only a new GDR leadership were to consider a number of the demands that are being framed in increasingly open terms.

These demands are nothing that couldn't be met, nothing that would call the GDR's existence into question.

Everything will thus depend on how the GDR solves its leadership problems and whether the shrewder leaders grasp the opportunity of reform the crisis involves.

What old-style East German officials Harry Tisch and Hermann Axen have had to say on the subject may not sound an optimistic note. But it needn't be the last word.

Ralf Lehmann

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, Essen, 18 September 1989)

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Kohl keeps a tight grip on the reins

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

If his opponents in the CDU leadership had their way Helmut Kohl would already end his political career before reaching the age of 60.

They would like to have seen the 750 delegates at the 37th CDU party congress in Bremen oust him as party chairman and Chancellor.

Once again, however, Helmut Kohl has come out on top. He is still Chancellor and still party chairman.

His position was not even weakened in Bremen, but, if anything, consolidated even further.

Until general election day in 1990 Helmut Kohl will remain firmly seated in the saddle. There is no-one around to seriously threaten his leadership.

Kohl is the man in charge. For the next 15 months the CDU will be a "Chancellor's party".

Kohl's dominance found its most obvious expression in the ejection of Baden-Württemberg Premier Lothar Späth from the CDU presidium.

Although Späth's undoing was not engineered by Kohl behind the scenes he will be more than pleased that his strongest rival has been stripped of power.

The composition of the votes cast for the party's deputy chairmen and chairwoman show just how much the party follows the interests of its leader.

The only Kohl critic to do extremely well was Norbert Blüm. Rita Süssmuth and Heiner Geissler, on the other hand, failed by far to come up to expectations.

The discussion about Kohl's report on his activities also revealed his dominant influence.

Not one of his deputy chairpersons dared criticise the party leader for fear of being left out on a limb.

During the next few months Kohl will probably make the painful experience what a burden such a powerful position can be.

The more dominant a role he plays in shaping the party's politics, the more vulnerable he becomes.

To a greater degree than in the past he will be held personally responsible for the internal state of the party and for each election outcome. How heavily this burden will weigh is not clear, especially since the CDU is not in a state in which Kohl can easily win laurels.

The party looks pretty encrusted: many sections of the party are cutting themselves off from the outside world in a kind of "barricading mentality."

Kohl's party has virtually lost its access to ordinary working people and to youth.

The fact that the two CDU groupings which particularly cater for voters in these categories, the *Sozialausschüsse* (social committees) and the *Junge Union* (the CDU's youth organisation), are no longer able to function successfully is a catastrophe.

Furthermore, the intact *Frauenunion* (the CDU women's organisation) has been debilitated by squabbling about statutes, although there are also underlying content-related differences of opinion.

The party's situation is made even more difficult by its apparently growing unwillingness to discuss issues extensively.



Goodbye. Kohl (left) with dismissed business manager Heiner Geissler. (Photo: Sven Simon)

In the past the CDU was at least willing to talk about issues within the party if ordered to do so by the party leadership. This was no longer the case at the Bremen party congress.

In particular the discussion on environmental policy, which is, after all, a decisive general election campaign issue, was disappointing.

Apart from Erwin Vetter (Baden-Württemberg) no *Land* Environment Minister took part in the discussion; even the leading environment experts in the CDU's parliamentary party in the Bundestag remained silent.

In view of this restraint it is fair to ask who is left to discuss the issues.

The CDU can count itself lucky that Bonn Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer had done his homework and that Bonn Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was extremely well briefed on asylum and aliens policies.

At least programmatically the CDU is prepared for the general election campaign in the two perhaps most important fields.

Otherwise, however, it seems doubtful whether Helmut Kohl was able to achieve the objective he set himself for the party congress in Bremen: to "get the party fit for the election marathon."

Heinz-Peter Finke

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 14 September 1989)

Defeat for potential challenger leaves risk of bigger rift

Is Lothar Späth the victim of his own policies? His party's refusal to re-elect him as deputy federal chairman of the CDU at the party congress in Bremen suggests that the answer is yes.

In the fields of economics and technology, or even in the fields of art and cultural affairs, Späth's policies were only partly compatible with Helmut Kohl's political objectives.

Above all, the practical approach and political style of the two conservative politicians is so dissimilar that personal differences of opinion and disagreement on issues were inevitable. This is unlikely to change.

These obvious differences were occasionally reduced to an inadequate comparative denominator: Helmut Kohl is a *Machtmensch* (a power-orientated person), whereas Lothar Späth is a *Macher* (a man of action).

One thing has become clear: Chancellor Kohl's position is firmly rooted in the party. He embodies a more traditional understanding of politics.

Späth, on the other hand, has a leaning towards the more imaginative and is more flexible than Helmut Kohl.

This explains why the two politicians have drifted apart over the years. Not so much on the political stage as behind it.

Lothar Späth, with the typical Swabian quality of speaking his mind, often criticised Helmut Kohl's political methods.

His own political ambitions and his popularity with other critics of Kohl in the CDU elevated the Baden-Württemberg Premiet to the risky heights of a substitute Chancellor, at least in the eyes of his rival candidate Helmut Kohl.

Franz Josef Strauss, who almost became Chancellor and thus victor over Helmut Kohl once and for all in 1980, always supported and encouraged Späth.

As opposed to Späth, however, Strauss was openly critical of Kohl. Späth has now suffered the most bitter defeat of his political career.

He was ready to run as rival candidate against Kohl, but lacked resolution at the decisive moment.

This is how his fellow party supporters now talk about his vacillation and failure.

Kohl undoubtedly wanted to give Späth a warning. The Chancellor is a man who nevers forgets and seldom forgives.

Yet he did not want a defeat on such a scale. He knows that this means a growing risk that the rift in the party will get bigger and bigger.

Following Heiner Geissler's dismissal as CDU business manager the rift is already big enough.

Rudolph Bernhard

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 13 September 1989)

Both houses of parliament mark milestone

The lower and upper houses of parliament, respectively the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, celebrated their 40th anniversary on 7 September.

In separate commemorative ceremonies, attended *inter alios* by Bonn President Richard von Weizsäcker, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the President of the Federal Constitutional Court Roman Herzog, speeches recalled the first sittings of the two legislative bodies in Bonn on 7 September, 1949.

Bundestag Speaker Rita Süssmuth (CDU) and the President of the Bundesrat, Schleswig-Holstein Premier Björn Engholm (SPD) took the opportunity to praise the work of the two constitutional bodies.

They emphasised that the Federal Republic of Germany has guaranteed democratic stability, peace and prosperity during the forty years of its existence.

Frau Süssmuth said that the Bundestag could be proud of what it had achieved. Over the past four decades it had become a "forum of the nation and a centre of democracy."

Parliament has gradually filled the constitution with life.

She added that the Bundestag paved the way for overcoming the collapse after 1945, for reconstruction and for the safeguarding of a modern constitutional and welfare state and the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the western alliance.

This does not, however, allow the conclusion to be drawn that "we have successfully created a state which will be open to and able to stand up to everything in future."

Frau Süssmuth expressed her regret that the "emotional detachment" of the citizens from parliament appears to be increasing.

She stressed that people should be able to recognise their own worries and problems in parliamentary activity.

Björn Engholm called for greater effort to find a common solution to existing problems and to set corresponding objectives up until the year 2000.

He insisted that the democracy of the various political lobbies will prove inadequate when it comes to cleaning up the environmental damage done during the last one hundred years on a large scale. "What we need is a new political consensus, not new lobbies and parties."

Referring to the work of the Bundesrat Engholm said that the representative body of the *Land* governments had never stood in the limelight of publicity in its function as a "counterpart to the Bundestag", often reacting rather than acting on its own initiative.

In his opinion the structure of the Bundesrat has tended to be conservative — "a stabilising federal organ of inconspicuous and greying dignity yet with considerable efficiency."

What is more, he contended, no other federal organ is "so utterly patriarchic" as the Bundesrat.

Engholm feels that this must change and that "it is already changing a little on the Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen and Berlin benches in the Bundesrat."

The Bundestag's first sitting took place on 7 September, 1949, in the hastily converted sports hall of the Päda-

Continued on page 4

■ PERSPECTIVE

Embarrassment and consternation in dispute over Auschwitz convent

The awful nature of the place corresponds to the degree of embarrassment that must inevitably be attached to disputes between Christians and Jews in connection with Auschwitz.

How could the old shed on the perimeter of the concentration camp where the Nazis stored the gas used to poison their prisoners — a shed where 14 Carmelite nuns have spent five years in quiet prayer — become a bone of contention?

It wasn't just because, according to Jewish religious tradition, houses of prayer are not permitted at places of death.

It was because an ominous Catholic discord was sounded from Germany, of all countries, when this Carmelite convent was set up at Auschwitz, giving rise to banal misunderstandings that were exacerbated by what are perhaps best described as Polish cardinal mistakes.

In 1985 Father Werenfried van Straaten, the overenthusiastic agitator of the *Ostpriesterhilfe*, a group in Königstein, near Frankfurt, that helps Roman Catholic priests in Eastern Europe, launched an international campaign to raise funds for the convent.

He described it as a "fortress for God" and a "present for the Pope." He even went so far as to term it a "pledge for the conversion of our misled brethren."

The Jews felt that meant them, and did so all the more for not even being mentioned in connection with a location that is a byword for their greatest national tragedy.

"We must admit that we Catholics may have underestimated the justified and understandable sensitivity of the Jewish community," wrote Jerzy Turowicz, editor of the Cracow *Catholic Weekly*, in 1986.

He counselled "countering this oversensitivity with respect." But respect has been lacking, despite an agreement reached between Catholics and Jews after lengthy negotiations in Geneva in July 1987.

Signed by four cardinals, including Archbishop Macharski of Cracow, the agreement was to rehouse the nuns in new quarters a few hundred yards from the death camp in an oecumenical centre of prayer and encounter that was to be newly built. It was to be built within two years, but no progress has yet been made, allegedly due to a shortage of materials and funds (which does not, however, seem to stayed the pace of construction of new churches elsewhere in Poland).

The delay has been so lengthy that suspicions have arisen and unfortunate overreactions have been triggered, such as when Jewish demonstrators from the United States forced their way into the convent and were evicted, to the accompaniment of anti-Semitic abuse, by Polish construction workers who were adding extensions to the convent, not demolishing it.

Instead of heeding such warning signs and taking prompt action in accordance with the terms of the 1987 agreement, Cardinal Macharski virtually cancelled it on 8 August. He said that in "this atmosphere of aggressive demands and breach of the peace in Poland" there could be no question of setting up a centre for mutual respect.

Was that an overreaction or was it, as some Jews suspected, merely a pretext for abandoning a commitment on which the Catholic Church had, in any case, been dragging its feet?

The Geneva co-signatories, including Cardinal Lustiger of Paris, whose mother was murdered in Auschwitz, were appalled.

Pope John Paul II, not usually at a loss for words, was not prepared to comment. It was, he said, a matter for the Polish bishops to decide. He has now been accused by Jewish critics of mentioning, in early August, in his long-winded Biblical exegesis, which usually goes way over the heads of Catholic pilgrims, the charges of "faithlessness" levelled at the people of Israel by Old Testament prophets.

In a 27 August memorandum marking the 50th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland he pilloried the mass murder of the Jews as an "eternal disgrace for mankind." He also condemned anti-Semitism as the "absolute opposite of the Christian view of human dignity." But that went virtually unnoticed.

Two days beforehand the Polish primate, Cardinal Glemp, had unfortunately told pilgrims in Czestochowa that the "dear Jews" must "not speak with us from the position of a people superior to all."

He even went so far as to claim that Polish anti-Semitism was a mere consequence of Jewish anti-Polish sentiment and made use of the most embarrassing clichés. He referred, for instance, to "the Jew who disseminates communism," barely offsetting such comments with a mention of "Israelites who gave their talent and their life to Poland."

On 1 September, at a reception for people of all religions who were in Warsaw to pray for peace, he finally came out against what he called the "scandal" and the "irrational gesture" of relocating the Auschwitz convent.

He even called into question the competence and common sense of his fellow-cardinal, Archbishop Macharski of Cracow, for having signed the Geneva agreement. The interview in which he made these comments was printed by an Italian newspaper, *La Repubblica*. Cardinal Glemp's secretary merely said it had not been authorised, not that the cardinal had not said any such thing.

What ever has come over Cardinal Glemp, who has hitherto been a level-headed man and shown no signs of angling for populistic acclaim?

In the prevailing climate of political reconstruction in Poland he has come under the influence of "national democratic" advisers, especially Professor Maciej Giertych.

As a member of the primate's advisory council on social affairs Professor Giertych dismissed the Geneva agreement in June as the dictate of a foreign power to which good Poles could only offer resistance.

In a confidential May 1988 memorandum he opposed "Western liberalism, which is alien to our tradition," and warned against ideological neutrality of the state, which was a "masonic model."

True tolerance only existed where Catholic morality prevailed.

Whatever one may feel about this morality, sensitivity for the feelings of those who hold other beliefs cannot be said to be its strong point.

Yet, as Cardinal König of Vienna has recently reminded "our Polish Catholic friends," this sensitivity would do credit to a Church that "too often kept its counsels to itself in the days of the Holocaust."

Hansjakob Stehle

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 8 September 1989)

Continued from page 3

gogische Akademie in Bonn, which became the parliament building.

Two of the 402 members of parliament in 1949 are still in the Bundestag today: the honorary SPD chairman Willy Brandt and the Deputy Speaker in the Bundestag Richard Stücklen (CSU).

The Bundesrat, which consists of the members of the *Land* governments, also convened for the first time on the same day in the assembly hall of the Pädagogische Akademie, which is still the plenary hall today. Since then the Bunderat sittings, of which the commemorative sitting on 7 September was the 603rd, have been numbered consecutively, since the Bundesrat does not have legislative periods.

(Mannheimer Morgen, 8 September 1989)

Churches talk about East Bloc changes

Changes in Eastern Europe have made many Germans unsure how to *respond to the situation, especially as* no-one can say how long or how effectively the changes will last.

This uncertainty was the keynote of the 39th Königstein *Kirche in Not* (Church in Distress) congress.

It was the first at which speakers did not, for the most part, speak for Eastern European churches in exile.

Most gave eye-witness accounts of developments in the Baltic states, in Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia — home countries to which they were to return.

Czechoslovakia was the exception. It did not allow its delegates to attend the conference.

The audience, consisting mainly of expatriates from these countries, had mixed feelings about what they were told.

Since the changes, said Professor Hampel of Giessen, it had no longer been enough to protest solidarity. It must be demonstrated in practice.

Algis Klimaitis came straight from Lithuania, where he had experienced the 50th anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin Pact at first hand.

He referred to the "replacement of the post-war system" that was in the process of taking shape.

The Baltic states were now being rediscovered by Western Europe as a part of Europe. The minimum consensus in the Baltic states was a conviction that things could no longer continue as they were.

There were, naturally, people who were opposed to change, but the pressure exerted by expectations was so great that a damper often had to be put on enthusiasm, while a lack of clear concepts was widespread in both East and West.

Klimaitis said the Baltic peoples had been disappointed that West Germany had made no official statement on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; they had not been expecting the GDR to do so but Moscow, after all, had not been the sole party to the pact.

He also objected to the view that trends in the Baltic were merely nationalist. The Baltic peoples were patriots and realists, he said.

Critical though he was of the threat from Moscow that the physical survival of the Baltic people would be in jeopardy if certain marks were overstepped, he realised the need fopr dialogue.

It must be conducted honestly and step by step. The Churches, he said, had exercised restraint during recent developments and were busy consolidating what had been achieved.

Events in the East Bloc are first and foremost political in nature, and politics is not the main concern of the Königstein congress. Its main concern is with intellectual forces and how to strengthen them.

This was particularly apparent in the contributions from Poland and Hungary. Stanislaw Dzida, a German studies specialist, outlined in detail the role of the Catholic Church in Poland.

He referred to the importance of a Church to which 95 per cent of the population belonged yet added that there were 900,000 abortions a year among a population of approximately 37 million and that intellectuals and the Church were poles apart.

He objected to the view that Polish Catholicism was solely traditional and conservative in outlook and incapable of renewal.

In a new society the Church was of fresh importance, in connection with drug or alcohol abuse or with consumer orientation.

Where reconciling ethics and morality with politics was concerned, the Church shared a common responsibility and an equally daunting task in East and West.

He agreed with Suffragan Bishop Várszegi of Budapest, who was convinced the new Hungarian government was prepared to *permit* the Church a major role in *cultural and religious life*.

The ideology that had until *recently* prevailed had been a failure *on these issues*, leaving a legacy of *disorientation*.

Bishop Várszegi *admitted that the* Church was not prepared for its new task and would have a number of difficulties to surmount. But he was optimistic.

"The need of the hour for Christians in Europe is not to gloat at the bankruptcy of socialism," said Professor Hampel in his concluding remarks.

Socialism, which had claimed to have an overall interpretation of the world, left behind a vacuum. It was clear in Königstein that the Church in East and West faced an equal challenge for peace's sake.

All participants were convinced of the importance of this point, as they were of the importance of the congress's role in exchanging information.

They felt sure a 40th congres would be held next year, although the shape it might take was not clear.

The Königstein venue, the Albertus Magnus College, is either to be sold to the local authority or used to house refugees from the East.

The German (Catholic) Episcopal Conference has decided to promote the congress in collaboration with the Oecumenical Church Commission.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 September 1989)

■ DISARMAMENT

Verification and visions of a costly utopia



An eye in the sky. Germany's Silberreiher reconnaissance aircraft.

(Photo: dpa)

For over a year men in strange uniforms have been turning up outside of the gates of the military complex at Wotkinsk, 1,000 kilometres east of Moscow.

Under the observant eyes of the Soviet soliders on guard members of the US army inspect, survey and weigh the vehicles travelling to and from the complex.

Sometimes they ask to take a look inside one of the huge containers with new missiles.

Very much the same thing is happening outside of a US missiles factory in Magna (Utah), but this time the "strange men" are wearing Soviet uniforms.

The "gate control" is part of a set of checks through which the superpowers ensure that the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe (INF) is observed and that no new Pershing 2s or SS 20s leave the factories.

An SS 25 is allowed to pass by the US sentries and the Soviet guards in the USA have no complaints about its "colleague."

"Verification" is the official name of this arms control procedure.

The corresponding provisions explain why the INF Treaty is ten times longer than similar treaties.

Nato and the Warsaw Pact want to go even further at the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe.

According to a Bonn Defence Ministry expert:

"Verification will be carried out on such a scale that we may ask ourselves whether military movements are at all possible in future without the presence of an inspector."

One month after the INF Treaty came into effect 20 teams of ten US inspectors respectively swarmed out in 60 days to inspect 125 locations in the Soviet Union.

Their task was to check the sites of the 1,500 missiles due to be dismantled and their support installations, camps and destruction sites; the Soviet inspectors did the same thing in the USA.

These figures give a rough idea of how difficult the task is when disarmament affects tens of thousands of tanks, guns, aircraft and helicopters. Thousands of individual units are stationed in Western and Eastern Europe and in the expanses of the European part of the Soviet Union.

In the Warsaw Pact the tanks are not being destroyed in the same way as the missiles; the tank turrets are being destroyed, but the chassis of the tracked vehicles are being converted for the agricultural sector.

But what guarantee is there that new turrets will not be secretly built again turn the civilian tractor into a tank some day?

Robert Summers, the head of the verification department of the US arms control and disarmament agency (ADCA) admits that these questions used to serve as a means of preventing the conclusion of arms control agreements as well as their observance.

Since the advent of the new East-West policy made possible by Gorbachov's "New Thinking" the armies not only have departments of arms procurement, but also departments for disarmament.

The Bonn Foreign Office and the Bonn Defence Ministry are in the process of setting up a "Department for the Arms Control Tasks of the Bundeswehr."

Seven hundred soldiers are to ensure compliance with future agreements.

If agreement is reached in Vienna in 1990 some of these "inspectors" will have to be ready for field assignment in 1991.

Verifying the INF Treaty was relatively "easy" because the agreement was drawn up between two superpowers.

In Vienna 16 Nato states are negotiating with seven Warsaw Pact countries.

The neutral and non-aligned countries are involved in a separate round of negotiations, which means that there would be a total of 35 inspecting states.

Nato stores its information on inspections in its own data bank.

The Brussels headquarters will also coordinate within the alliance, but there will not be an integrated control.

The motto is: verification is a national task.

The scientists at a peace research conference organised by the *Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung* in Bonn asked why there is no joint approach.

Talking from experience one of the West German officers spontaneously answered: "Please remember, France is in the group."

Apart from on-site inspections one of the most important means of verification is satellite reconnaissance, something previously classed as espionage.

Depending on their technology the satellites can not only identify troop movements, but also individual vehicles and even types of vehicles.

The superpowers have an information monopoly in this field.

The new West German space agency Dara, however, will help the Bonn Defence Ministry in its "military ground observation."

At present there is no sign of a suitable European satellite for this job, but the Federal Republic of Germany hopes to make a contribution at a "lower level": the German air force now has a special scout plane called *Silberreiher I*.

At an altitude of 17,000 metres the pictures which can be taken by its highly sophisticated cameras are so exact that it is almost possible to recognise the badge of rank on soldiers' uniforms.

From 1997 onwards it is hoped that 15 of these extremely low-noise aircraft will be put into service. In future, satellites, aircraft and on-site inspectors will be supported by even more modern technology.

At the University of Bochum, for example, a team of physicists led by Jürgen Altmann and Bernhard Gonslor are testing the use of sensors which can detect the sound of vehicles and vibrations on the ground.

These sensors can differentiate between tracked vehicles and vehicles with wheels, giving a signal if a vehicle is particularly heavy and if there is an indication that artillery is being transported.

Once installed at military locations or on the roads the sensors could provide a general idea of the movement of troops and weapons.

In the spirit of the "New Thinking" the scientists from Bochum have been able to test the system on the rattling of the chains of Czechoslovakian tanks in collaboration with the Prague Academy of Sciences.

Another means of verification is known as "tagging".

Aircraft, for example, are given an indestructible "label" which responds to electronic stimuli.

If there is no response at all the inspectors will know that the maximum number of aircraft agreed on in a treaty has been exceeded.

Arthur Knoth from the armaments company Dornier, who has already registered two patents for this system, presented this concept in Bonn.

The fact that the conference of the peace researchers in Bonn was attended by numerous military attachés showed how "hot" the idea is.

The commercial arms control researcher made it clear that industry has realised the future prospects for this market.

Whereas the peace researchers from the universities advocated support for the system because of its low costs Knoth warned: "It is not going to be cheap."

The experience with the INF Treaty would suggest that he is absolutely right: the first one-and-a-half years of verification inspections cost the USA $300m.

According to current estimates the 15 German *Silberreiher*, including the ground stations, will cost DM1.5bn.

A Swiss diplomat attending the conference in Bonn, whose country is known for its business-mindedness and its will to defend, outlined a Utopian vision.

He envisioned a world in which verification would cost so much money that there is no money left for the weapons. People in the armaments industry, however, would not lose their jobs, since someone has to produce the verification equipment.

Thomas Kröter

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 9 September 1989)

■ EUROPE

The Delors Plan and the winding routes in the direction of monetary union

European Community Finance Ministers and central bank governors meeting in Antibes, France, have reaffirmed their intention of implementing the first stage of the Delors Plan by the middle of next year.

The emphasis will thus be mainly on deregulation of the capital market. What, then, about the European Monetary Union?

European politicians such as Bonn's Helmut Haussmann, Federal Economic Affairs Minister, felt the European Commission had done a fine job of work.

At last, they said, there was a document that outlined a realistic approach toward an economic and monetary union in Europe.

The reference was to the Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, otherwise known as the Delors Report, after the European Commission's French president, Jacques Delors.

A few weeks later this jubilation had largely blown over, and since June and the European Community's Madrid summit meeting there has been growing criticism of the Delors Report.

Britain's Margaret Thatcher has by no means been its only critic. In an interview with the *Financial Times* Bundesbank president Karl Otto Pöhl put a further damper on hopes of swift progress toward European Monetary Union.

He said he could imagine Germans objecting strenuously to the proposal once they had realised what was at stake: their money.

It is indeed, but it is also a matter of whether an internal market necessitates a monetary union or simpler solutions are conceivable.

Mrs Thatcher for one would like British experts to come up with an answer to this question.

On closer scrutiny, politicians and economists are found to be agreed on two points only:

- One is that if frontiers are thrown open within the European Community for manufacturing industry and labour, there must be a free flow of capital too.

The internal market cannot work if fiscal, bureaucratic and other obstacles are to be removed but the movement of capital that accompanies cross-border economic activities is to be handicapped.

Capital must be able to move as freely as goods and labour within the Community.

- The other is that an internal market presupposes stable exchange rates between the currencies of the countries concerned.

Flexible rates simply cannot be reconciled with the idea of an internal market, let alone an economic union.

In theory, of course, goods, services, labour and capital could move freely between countries even if exchange rates were floated, but the countries concerned would then be competitors in international markets rather than partners in an internal market.

Sound economic arguments can be advanced in support of an internal market with fixed exchange rates. They cut the cost of cross-border transactions because exporters don't need to cover themselves against exchange rate risks.

What is more, there is no incentive for capital movements of the kind frequently triggered solely by expectations of exchange rate realignments, leaving many a central bank in a tight corner.

Last but not least, central banks can then no longer pursue an active exchange rate policy (otherwise known as dirty floating), thereby distorting the competitive position to their respective country's advantage.

But how is this aim to be achieved? The Delors Report is extremely vague on the subject. Its plan of action, a monetary union to be set up in three phases, is far too sketchy.

Basically, it allows for any conceivable option as long as it leads to the objective, monetary union.

First, the European Monetary System (EMS) is to be gradually extended to become a system of fixed exchange rates.

Second, Community governments agree to set up a monetary union by the terms of which either member-currencies are firmly pegged to each other at fixed exchange rates or a single European currency, such as the ecu, is the sole legal tender.

Third, a European monetary authority issues a European currency that is used alongside national currencies.

The EMS option would envisage this European currency assuming the role of a key currency, whereas it would in time replace national currencies in a monetary union.

In the 10 years for which it has existed the EMS has worked most successfully, but it is still far from being a system of fixed exchange rates.

The exchange rates of member-currencies may vary within a bandwidth of 2.25 per cent of an agreed parity (six per cent in the case of the lira and the peseta).

The exchange rates of EMS currencies have been realigned 11 times to take changing economic circumstances into account.

En route to a system of fixed exchange rates these bandwidths would need to be gradually eliminated, while individual member-countries must no longer be entitled to revise exchange rates.

The governments concerned will not be able to do either until they have officially

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agreed on an EMS key currency and accept unreservedly the monetary policy pursued by the key currency's central bank.

The other central banks would have to dispense with independent monetary policies. Their sole task would be to keep exchange rates stable in relation to the key currency, to toe the line, as it were.

As matters now stand, the German Bundesbank would be the central bank of the key currency, which is what the deutschemark has de facto long been.

In theory this role could later be taken over by another currency if it were to prove stabler in the long term.

The advantages of this approach would be a minimum of red tape; national central banks would continue to exist and a European central bank would not be necessary.

Progress toward setting up an internal monetary market could run parallel to economic integration of markets in the European Community.

One disadvantage is that it would be fairly easy for a country to leave the EMS as its national monetary system would continue to exist.

It wouldn't be as easy if there were a monetary union because a national monetary authority would first need to be re-established.

A mainly psychological disadvantage of this approach is the predominance of a given national currency.

In a monetary union member-countries would similarly have to forgo national monetary sovereignty, but each country would have a say in framing the monetary policy pursued by a European central bank.

Individual countries would in contrast be powerless to influence the monetary policy pursued by the central bank of a key currency country, and Mrs Thatcher would not be alone in finding the idea of having a second-rate currency in international economic terms hard to stomach.

That is the reason why a number of politicians, such as François Mitterrand, and the European Parliament would sooner see a monetary union or an EMS with a system of fixed exchange rates and a single European currency, such as the ecu, which would amount to the same.

They would evidently prefer the predominance of a common European currency to that of a national currency.

But mention must be made of another feature of the monetary union plan. It is an institutional solution that could be used to exert pressure on member-governments to harmonise their national market arrangements.

A monetary union will obviously not work if wildly different legal and institutional rules apply in national markets or, in other words, if competitive conditions differ in the respective economies.

Everyone in Germany would dismiss as an April Fool's Day item reports that, say, Bavaria had scrapped road tax on Bavarian-registered cars, that the Schleswig-Holstein central bank planned to scrap the minimum reserve system for commercial banks and that Hesse proposed to levy a withholding tax on interest payments.

Chaos would be a foregone conclusion. People would register their cars in Bavaria, banks would transfer their head offices to Kiel or Lübeck and savers would invest their savings outside Hesse.

The present situation in the European Community is much more complicated, and the crucial question is whether the pressure exerted by a monetary union to harmonise market arrangements is sufficient or, conversely, the internal monetary market is doomed to failure because politicians will be unable to agree on this point.

The sceptics' solution is parallel currencies, getting off to a small start and gradually, as the European central bank and its European currency gains in importance, increasing pressure on member-governments to harmonise market arrangements.

This European currency, the ecu, say, must compete with and hold its own against national currencies in the open market.

That means the ecu will have to lose its "basket" character and become a "bona fide" currency.

At present the ecu is based on a basket of 12 currencies, so it cannot, in theory, be any stabler than the stablest EMS member-currency.

Yet it would need to be just that if it were to take on the role of a key currency.

Even if this were solved and the ecu were to gain a value of its own, problems would remain.

With the existence of a parallel currency national central banks will find managing the monetary controls tough. They can control the quantity of their own currency in circulation but not that of the European currency. Only the European central bank would be able to do that, but it too could only control the total amount in circulation and not where it circulated.

Italians, for instance, could change lire into ecus and invest in Germany. The amount of money in circulation would decline in Italy and increase in Germany.

It is hard to say whether that would be in line with the economic policy brief. A politico-psychological argument against the parallel currency concept carries even greater weight. It is that competition between the ecu and national currencies would lead to stronger currencies replacing weaker ones as everyone tried to invest in the stablest currency available.

The Five Wise Men, or panel of experts who advise the Economic Affairs Ministry have described the consequences: "In each individual country the success of European integration, taken as meaning that of the European currency, would at the same time denote the failure of national monetary policy.

"That is not a very attractive proposition for governments answerable, in the final analysis, to national electorates."

In other words, successfully championing European integration would lead to a monetary slap in the face for politicians which would augur ill for the prospects of a European parallel currency.

For some states, the experts infer, it would make more sense to launch a single currency and set up a monetary union right away. A monetary union is the firmest peg imaginable. It would, for EC countries, be the full-scale solution.

But "the preconditions for swift institutional steps in the direction of economic and monetary union have not yet been fulfilled by any means," says Trier economist Wolfgang Filc. "Actionism that is not based on firm economic foundations" he warns, "can only be to the detriment of European integration." Others agree.

In other words, if the monetary union is used as the drayhorse of the economic union there would be a risk of the cart getting stuck in the mud and the dream of European integration being broken.

Another option is for politicians to bide their time on monetary union until the economic preconditions have been met.

Economic and monetary union could then become a programme for the next millennium, national egoism having so far -- at least — proved extremely resistant to European compromise.

So pragmatists will not advocate the full-scale solution. Their choice will be the first option, that of converting the EMS into a system of fixed exchange rates.

That is not only less expensive but also based on tried and trusted ideas, and the crucial advantage is that economic and monetary policymakers would aim in joint harness at European integration.

The one might be more active at one stage, the other at another, but they would always both be in harness, and that has invariably proved conducive to progress.

But the politicians must be clear on one point. They can only write their voters a European monetary prescription if their (the voters') condition were then (again at least) no worse than at present. In a free and democratic society no-one must be forced to exchange good money for bad.

Bernhard Blohm

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 15 September 1989)

■ INNOVATION

Advising Gyro Gearlooses on patenting and marketing their inventions

An inventor's lot is not a happy one. He spends time and money thinking up new ideas that may, in a world so full of new ideas, not be new at all.

And they mustn't be just technical tricks. An invention has to be useful. There has to be a demand for it. It has to be marketable, and the competition is fierce.

Where does he (or she) stand in respect of legal safeguards? Ought an inventor not to be sufficiently ingenious to work that out for himself too?

In this respect inventors have never had it so good. Facilities exist; they need only to be used.

They are advice bureaus for inventors, and they aren't obscure consultants who do little or nothing for good money. They are serious, semi-official agencies that are very helpful and charge no fee for their services.

In Hamburg, for instance, inventors and would-be inventors can consult the Chamber of Commerce's patent centre every Thursday from 2 p.m. Free initial advice is given by patent lawyers.

They explain the most convenient, least expensive, safest and most time-saving way of getting a new idea legally protected.

A design can be registered for a mere DM50; it doesn't have to be entirely new or original. A trade mark can be registered. Service symbols and plant varieties can be registered.

Then there is the fully-fledged patent, which costs DM650 to apply for. But international patent rights and protection can cost up to DM40,000.

Free advice may not be entirely selfless. It is a service that enhances the reputation of the institution that provides it; it is also publicity for the legal specialists who give it.

But it is still extremely useful for those who need advice. Would-be inventors often don't know it is available, but there is still a brisk demand for the service.

"In Hamburg about 400 people a year consult us on Thursday afternoons," says qualified engineer Andrea Koch.

There is no way a journalist is going to be allowed to listen in to a session and tell readers what happens. Patent rights would be jeopardised if details of a new idea were to be published before the patent was registered.



Advice bureaus are run in other German cities too, at technology and innovation centres and at patent investigation departments in Aachen, Berlin, Bielefeld, Bremen, Darmstadt, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Hanover, Kaiserslautern, Munich, Nuremberg and Stuttgart.

Nuremberg can fairly claim to provide the widest range of services, some dating back 120 years. It holds an annual trade fair for inventors and boasts the head offices of trade associations.

Nuremberg was also the home town of Peter Henlein, who invented the watch (pocket or wrist-), surely a classic invention, in 1510.

Nowadays Munich is even more important. The Bavarian capital boasts the German Patent Office, the European Patent Office, the Federal Patent Court, the patent bureau of the Scientific Research Association and the patent lawyers' professional association.

In Nuremberg, where free advice is given on the first Wednesday in the month, Lothar Wild handles seven clients at most.

But each spends 20 to 30 minutes in camera with a patent lawyer, of which there are 900 in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Patent lawyers have to be fully qualified engineers or scientists. They must then spend three years studying law and pass special exams.

They can answer the first detailed questions. They must first know what the invention is, then they can check what ideas have already been patented in this sector.

They explain what application procedures need to be followed and what fees are likely to be charged for which services.

The findings of a survey by the Ifo economic research institute, Munich, indicate that the patent lawyer's services cost, on average, DM3,800 per application.

Professional inventors doubtless know the ropes, but they are usually employed by large firms which have patent departments of their own and regularly apply for patents and register designs and trade marks.

About 55 per cent of applicants and 90 per cent of the 32,000 German patents annually registered are submitted by industry, with the emphasis on electrical and mechanical engineering and pharmaceuticals.

The remainder are applied for by small and medium-sized firms, by university departments and by freelance inventors who don't manufacture products of their own.

The freelance category includes the Gyro Gearlooses of this world (remember Donald Duck's inventor cousin?), who are constantly coming up with either new ideas on perpetual motion or improvements to existing ideas.

They include a succession of new designs for automatic transmission units for motor vehicles, of ingenious detergent packets and practical bottle caps.

In Hamburg Andrea Koch says medical and dental innovations have been on the increase for years. So, of late, have new environmental ideas.

A popular idea these days is the production of molecular hydrogen by algae and bacteria and ways of reducing the nitrate count in water, says the German Patent Office.

Lothar Wild, who has been advising inventors for decades, says there has lately been a distinct and gratifying improvement in the quality of ideas and questions his clients come up with.

The semi-official patent advice bureaus agree. Many inventors turn up with detailed plans and scale models. But few of them have carried out systematic research into what already exists in their sector.

Yet there is nothing to stop members of the public from consulting the library and archives of the German Patent Office in Munich, whereas a broker's services are advisable in checking with one of the 60-odd data banks all over the world.

They include the Bertelsmann data bank services, STN International in Karlsruhe and Network in Bochum, to name but three German banks.

An Ifo survey commissioned by the Federal Economic Affairs Ministry confirms how important these facilities are:

"Most applicants don't know enough about patent law or engineering to make efficient and appropriate use of the patent system."

That has consequences. Experts say negligent disregard of what has long been public knowledge and superfluous investment in capital and labour cost an estimated DM15bn a year.

The failure rate at the Patent Office is an established fact. Two out of three applications are found not to qualify for patents. Applicants are not notified for, as a rule, two years; it used to be over four.

The semi-official patent bureau of the Scientific Research Association plays a special role. It has a staff of 30. All of them, including patent lawyers, are bound to secrecy.

Their brief is to help freelance inventors to secure patent rights and put their ideas to practical use by referring them to interested manufacturers.

The practical, commercial value of an invention is thus a crucial yardstick in their work.

If the prospects look good, the inventor is offered a no-risk interest-free loan to help him market his idea.

Interest-free is misleading, of course. None is charged, and the loan doesn't even have to be repaid, if there is little or no return on the investment.

But repayment is due, plus a percentage of earnings, if the idea earns money. "We earn about half what we cost," says engineer Hans-Jochen Bischof, in charge of the bureau.

It is consulted by about 1,000 inventors a year, and at least 100 are offered grants comparable, in a way, with university grants.

In 1988 the bureau's earnings from licence fees were DM2.8m, which corresponded to about DM70m in turnover on referral and utilisation of new ideas.

Given the sums involved in patents and licence agreements, that may be a mere drop in the ocean. But using facilities of this kind, intended to get technical progress off the ground, is important.

A country like Germany, poor in raw materials and dependent on exports, relies heavily in the face of international competition on the swift turnover of new ideas and research findings.

Only economies that are prepared to innovate can hope to stay competitive and to hold their own against innovative challenges.

Safeguarding new ideas and thus boosting market shares is a challenge in itself.

Eckart Klaus Roloff

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 8 September 1989)

■ BUSINESS

Daimler-Benz takeover bid approved

The Economics Minister, Helmut Haussmann has overturned a Cartel Office ban and approved Daimler-Benz's proposed takeover of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), which has a 37.7 per cent holding in Airbus Industrie. The Minister took the controversial step, which will lead to an operation with a combined turnover of about 80 billion marks, because of "over-riding economic interests."

The final act in the drama of the merger between Daimler-Benz and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) was the most boring.

After the Federal Cartel Office had fulfilled its competition policy duties by banning the merger Bonn Economics Minister, Helmut Haussmann, surprised nobody by authorising it.

He had no option but to act as a "vicarious agent" for the reorganisation of industry initiated by his predecessor in office and fellow Free Democrat, Martin Bangemann.

The government has granted itself absolution. The starting point for the merger was not entrepreneurial intention, but the government's inability to give the Airbus production a sound economic basis and turn the highly bureaucratic MBB group into a dynamic enterprise.

With the power of the Deutsche Bank behind it, Germany's biggest industrial group Daimler-Benz can now grow even bigger.

The new Daimler/MBB conglomerate will retain a dominant market position in the German aerospace industry and in military technology.

The result is one of the branch groups of the kind envisaged by the Social Democrats many years ago.

The fact that liberal politicians have brought about this development is particularly depressing.

The conditions Haussmann tied to his authorisation look more like merger cosmetics, despite a number of tighter stipulations and the demand for an "unlocking" of interlocking directorates. Neither Daimler nor MBB were willing to accept extensive conditions.

The dominant position of Daimler/MBB in the various segments of military technology will not be weakened, even though marine technology has been separated.

The new jumbo concern will be the only supplier in many sectors. This means less competition on the German market, and Bonn Defence Ministry officials will find it extremely difficult to discover cheaper alternatives for certain orders.

The leading role of Daimler/MBB in the development of military technology systems reinforces the market position and pools the resources for the new discoveries every market needs. Thanks to the merger Daimler will also benefit from R & D subsidies.

Although the Airbus risk is to be passed on to Daimler/MBB much earlier and to a greater extent than originally planned there are still fears that the government may in the end have to assume responsibility for ballast it was hoping to shed.

A prerequisite for the reduction of subsidies is that the dollar does not fall over a longer period and that European Airbus production on the whole is given a management structure based on private-enterprise principles.

The fact that small and medium-sized firms are to be taken into account more often and more profitably as subcontractors in future is to be welcomed.

Everyone knows, however, what position subcontractors of big company groups are in, and the new Daimler/MBB group is even bigger.

The chairman of the Discussion Group of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses in the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Pinger, quite rightly pointed out that firms in this category will at best become the "object of benevolent patronage."

The influence of the Deutsche Bank in this huge conglomerate has not been reduced. Even the Monopolies Commission (an advisory body, not to be confused with the Cartel Office, which approves or rejects merger plans) in its mild and understanding report expressed concern about this and recommended a clear separation of interests.

Haussmann cannot order this to be done. The largest German banking house has not been willing to make a gesture in this respect.

On the contrary. Deutsche Bank, which itself strives for a greater dimension, has criticised public displeasure as petty-minded.

This attitude is likely to lead to a growing demand for a more far-reaching legal restriction of the power of banks.

The most unpleasant aspect of the merger is the fact that the state remains involved in this giant enterprise in the form of the *Länder*, Bavaria, Hamburg and Bremen, albeit to a lesser extent

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Airbus a decisive factor in creation of jumbo group

The merger between Daimler-Benz and Messerchmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) is not unique just because of its size.

The double role played by the Bonn government as partner in negotiations and as the decision-making body was also unique.

Helmut Kohl's government, which had championed the cause of privatisation and reducing subsidies, wanted to rid itself of a high-subsidy project which dates back to the days of the Grand Coalition.

It was obvious, however, that the merger plans would eventually have to be vetted by the Bonn Economics Minister because of the serious competition policy doubts of the Federal Cartel Office.

The only alternative to facing up to this conflict would have been to carry on living with high Federal Government subsidies.

Economics Minister Haussmann has referred to an additional figure of DM5bn up until the year 2000.

The criticism by the SPD was just as unsurprising as Haussmann's authorisation tied to meeting certain conditions.

The SPD economics expert, Wolfgang Roth, said the procedure and its outcome were a "competition policy scandal".

This claim, however, was refuted by the former vice-chairman of the SPD and ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in an article in the weekly magazine, *Die Zeit*.

Schmidt recalls two motives which already prompted the Social Democrats

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over a decade ago to consider the idea of a merger: "A total European dependence on a few very big US groups in the fields of aircraft construction, power units and electronics" was to be prevented by extending the Airbus family "even at the cost of initially substantial subsidies".

Furthermore, the resources of the fragmented German aviation and aerospace industry" were to be pooled "under an efficient industrial management."

According to Schmidt the collapse of the SPD-FDP coalition was one of the main reasons why this did not take place.

Had it taken place, Roth would have been in the embarrassing situation of criticising his own Chancellor.

Haussmann began his statement on the merger authorisation by claiming that he has "no guilty conscience."

This indicates his state of mind following one of the most difficult economic policy decisions since the war. It also reveals that he is determined to employ a strategy of forward defence.

Haussmann's aim when laying down conditions for merger implementation was to achieve his main objective without having to accept serious adverse effects for the economy as a whole. He has done this successfully.

There are bound to be unclear interpretations. His intention was to "make a decision in a national regulatory policy dicussion which will only become understandable in the medium term in the European context."

He pointed out that it was a "strange situation" indeed to act as if there was a pure market economy on the procurement market for military goods.

Haussmann seems determined to open up this market to competition. This could take the sting out of American criticism, which is based on trade policy arguments.

Although the conflicts resulting from the "connection between the biggest German bank and the biggest German industrial enterprise" (Monopolies Commission) are significant they go far beyond the merger case and could not be considered by Haussmann.

They are the subject of separate parliamentary initiatives by the coalition and will hopefully lead to a limitation of the influence of banks during this parliamentary term.

Haussmann's stipulation that the group must part company with its "military support companies" within a year has far-reaching implications.

They are of such key importance to the definition of demand and in the appraisal of the procurement market that an interdependence with suppliers is unacceptable.

Conditions or not, Daimler-Benz will continue its development into a mighty technology group. Like General Motors or Mitsubishi it has no alternative.

Regardless of any decision by Haussmann for or against the merger the former motor group is shaping up for growing international integration.

Heinz Heck

(Die Welt, Bonn, 9 September 1989)

Giant anatomy

Germany's biggest industrial group, Daimler-Benz AG, has a new organisational structure.

MBB will probably be integrated within Deutsche Aerospace AG (known inside the group as Dasa).

Under the umbrella of the Daimler-Benz holding company, this subsidiary, which was set up in May, is responsible for aerospace and armaments.

It includes Dornier, MTU and Telefunken-System-Technik, which formerly belonged to AEG.

Alongside the Deutsche Aerospace AG the Mercedes-Benz AG takes care of Daimler's motor business and AEG is in charge of electronics.

The biggest company in the new Daimler trio is Mercedes with a turnover of roughly DM55bn, followed by AEG with DM13bn and the Dasa which expects a turnover of roughly DM8bn this year.

Daimler employs about 340,000 people worldwide. Deutsche Bank has a 28.3 per cent stake in the group and the state of Kuwait owns 14 per cent.

A further 25.2 per cent share of the group is held by Mercedes-Automobil-Holding, an umbrella holding for individual shareholders, several banks, insurances and industrial companies.

Roughly a third of Daimler's capital is in the hands of over 300,000 small shareholders.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 9 September 1989)

MBB's origins

The biggest German aerospace and armaments company, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm GmbH (MBB), resulted from a merger between a number of German aircraft construction firms in 1969.

The merger participants were the firms of the aircraft designer Willy Messerschmitt (founded in 1923 in Bamberg), of the entrepreneur Ludwig Bölkow (1926 in Ottobrunn) and the shipyard founder Hermann Blohm (1877 in Hamburg).

In an extremely complex ownership structure the previous MBB owners were the *Länder* Bavaria, Hamburg and Bremen, the companies Siemens, Bosch, Bremer Vulkan, Allianz-Versicherung, Dresdner Bank, Bayerische Vereinsbank, and, to a minor extent, the families of the former company founders.

With a total turnover of roughly DM7bn MBB's share of the military technology market is estimated at 54 per cent. The group has a payroll of 38,000 employees.

Military technology is mainly in Ottobrunn and Bremen. Transport and commercial aircraft and parts for the European Airbus are produced in Hamburg, Bremen, Einswarden, Lemwerder, Stade and Varel.

Power and communication systems for the aerospace industry are developed and produced in Bremen, Trauen, Ottobrunn and Lampoldshausen.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 9 September 1989)

■ MONEY

The prickly links between taxes and green trees

Cleaning up the environment costs money. That means taxes. In this article for *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*, Klaus Hofmeier looks at the prickly connection between taxes, the environment and social issues.

The state has always needed ample revenue to pay its way, and taxpayers are taxed in a variety of ways, not to say whenever the opportunity arises, so that people and companies don't realise how heavily they are taxed.

To ensure the steadiest possible flow of tax revenue officials are committed to the principles of fair taxation and taxation in accordance with the taxpayer's ability to pay.

All this means is that high earners pay high taxes, as do prolific consumers.

Taxation has always been a means of implementing social policies. Which is why the emphasis varies from one government to the next.

In the 1970s, for instance, the Social Democrats wanted to see how heavily companies could be taxed, so entrepreneurs were taxed to the hilt.

The present Bonn coalition took office with the aim of ensuring that performance was worthwhile. Which is why higher income brackets have benefited most from the present tax reform schemes.

Taxation has always been an instrument of economic policy. If companies are to be persuaded to invest, they are offered tax incentives such as special depreciation allowances, postdating and antedating of losses for tax purposes, or a straightforward cut in the top rate of income or corporation tax.

Taxation has always, or so it is said, been geared to the needs of the family. The more sublime the object of the exercise is (investment promotion or encouraging families, for instance), the more rapturous the applause.

The same applies to the latest taxation policy objective, that of improving the environment by increasing existing taxes, such as oil duty, and introducing new ones, such as a tax on carbon dioxide emission.

A policy that has always been complicated, confusing and contradictory has now reached a new stage, with people slowly realising that taxation policy itself is gradually being overtaxed.

Yet the prospect of ecological laurels makes politicians keen to jump on to the bandwaggon.

A wide range of ecological taxes have been mooted. They include basing road tax, the tax on motor vehicles, on emission rather than on engine size. This has already been agreed.

Other options are scrapping road tax entirely and increasing oil duty accordingly, increasing oil duty irrespective of road tax, taxing energy consumption in general, and taxing carbon dioxide emission as a means of combating the greenhouse effect.

All tax proposals are opposed, and the arguments against them are well known. A tax on carbon dioxide is not to the liking of the coal industry. A tax on energy consumption in general upsets both the nuclear power lobby and the advocates of energy alternatives.

A drastic increase in oil duties is strongly opposed by welfare policymakers; they are worried about the effect it would have on people who commute to work. Carmakers and the motor industry are naturally unenthusiastic.

Many welfare policymakers have discovered that taxing energy, no matter what kind, is a tax on consumption, and indirect, consumer taxes invariably hit low income earners harder than the well-to-do.

Viewed in this light, it is no surprise that all political parties say ecological taxes alone will not be enough to make the trees green and the water pure again.

So they envisage environmental taxes combined with mandatory emission ceilings and levies on sewage, waste water, emission, battery farming and so on.

Parties are increasingly enthusiastic about breaking taboos of old, at least verbally.

The Social Democrats, who only recently decried higher oil duties as a shameful injustice, suddenly have no qualms about a major realignment from direct to indirect taxes.

The Christian Democrats, who used to abhor both regimentation and taxation, are growing increasingly adept at ringing the changes.

The Free Democrats are now thinking as hard about new and higher taxes for the environment's sake as though Liberals had always favoured making consumers and entrepreneurs pay for the damage they did to the eco-system. Only the Greens have remained true to themselves.

Yet despite this universal enthusiasm for the environment, traditional parties have not lost sight of their old objectives.

The SPD, for instance, has remained true to its Social Democratic heritage in advocating a higher basic allowance (on which income tax is not charged), a uniform children's allowance and a substantial increase in the mileage allowance for commuters (which would offset the higher cost of motor fuel).

The coalition parties in Bonn continue to beaver away at a reform of company taxation with a view to easing the tax burden on business.

The Free Democrats are particularly keen on this idea. They plan to reduce company taxation by DM27bn a year from 1993.

Companies certainly claim to be hard hit by the burden of heavy taxation, and cutting company taxes does not seem to be much in keeping with the environmental tax debate.

So FDP supporters of tax relief for (ailing) companies have promptly dismissed all plans, including FDP plans, for an ecological restructuring of the economy as half-baked.

The environmental debate has so far worked on two assumptions. One is that economic growth will make it easier to step up environmental protection. The other is that environmental investment, arguably triggered by tax incentives, will lead to fresh growth and export opportunities.

Environmental technology is said to be in demand all over the world. That sounds plausible, but it doesn't alter the fact that environmental protection costs money.

It has to be bought either by thrift or by environmental investment.

Thrift (energy-saving, for instance) would first mean a decline in demand, which must surely lend straight to lower growth and less tax revenue.

These losses may be offset, but not until the change-over to environment-friendly production techniques and an environment-friendly range of goods and services has been completed.

Environmental investment has to be paid for, and that means either higher prices or lower wages or state incentives (tax breaks or grants) or any combination of the three.

They will naturally limit the financial scope for other political objectives, such as easing the corporate tax burden or encouraging the family.

Taxation could well prove most effective, training consumers to economise and providing an incentive for environmental investment, — *if only it were high enough.*

But politicians are reluctant to impose heavy taxes because of the undesirable consequences. Besides, levies only make sense if they prevent environmental destruction and the proceeds are used to finance environmental investment.

So taxes have to be heavy, otherwise they will fail to serve the purpose. The same goes for mandatory regulations; environmental investment will only be triggered by stringent standards.

So it is misleading, to say the least, to create the impression that environmental protection is an accompaniment of economic growth.

The greater the importance that is attached to environmental policy, the poorer the prospects will be for other economic and social policy projects that cost money.

Many politicians, especially those who would like to please all and sundry, find this hard to stomach.

Klaus Hofmeier

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 8 September 1989)

Continued from page 8

than before. So there can be no talk, of a true privatisation of MBB and Airbus. Although Daimler boss Reuter has ruled out any locational and job guarantees, the political influences and constraints remain. The *Länder* have already managed to obtain of concessions.

And what will happen if jobs are in jeopardy? It is this fusion of government and private enterprise, of political decision-making and strictly business-orientated considerations, which makes the merger a problem in social policy terms — not its sheer size alone. This is no "quantum leap of power" which could turn Germany into a military-industrial complex.

But, concern about the possible existence of a state within a state is only natural.

In an age of global economic transactions no-one can seriously advocate a total return to the "small-is-beautiful" ideal.

This does not mean, however, that every large-scale merger is a great entrepreneurial feat.

The adverse effects of this merger in competition policy terms outweigh the benefits for economy as a whole.

The biggest, most spectacular and politically controversial merger in the history of Germany is the result of poor industrial policy. The ministerial authorisation is not an act of courageous political leadership, but a dangerous political seduction.

Jürgen Jeske

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 9 September 1989)

■ ARCHAEOLOGY/EXHIBITIONS

Flogging a Trojan horse to death and other ancient secrets

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

A hundred years ago, the German wholesaler and archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann dug like one possessed to find the ancient city of Troy described by Homer. Now Professor Manfred Korfmann, an archaeologist from Tübingen, has extracted two more secrets from the excavation site on the Dardanelles. First, Troy was settled 500 years earlier than had previously been thought. On a steep slope of the rock underlying the ruins, Korfmann discovered charcoal dating from the middle of the fourth millennium B.C. — "Troy Zero." And second, Homer's city, Troy VI, comprised not only a fortress but also a lower city four times as large, systematically laid out and with attractive homes.

Although Korfmann does not regard himself as a literary scholar, he looks upon Homer, who wrote the *Iliad* around 730 B.C., as "perhaps mankind's greatest poet." To this very day, the Greek legend of the Trojan War lives on in the lines of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* — as evidenced by Jean Anouilh's *Antigone* and *Kassandra* by Christa Wolf.

But Homer's epic poems also achieved a political status matched by few others. "It was politically essential that the Trojan War can be interpreted *as a struggle of the West against the* East, Europe against Asia," Korfmann said. The East had become powerful under the Persians.

When the Persian King Xerxes crossed the Dardanelles with his huge army in 480 B.C., *he visited King* Priam's castle and sacrificed 1,000 head of cattle to the goddess Athena. One hundred and fifty years later the West struck back: Alexander the Great led his armed forces into Asia Minor and paid homage to Achilles at the site of his grave, not far from Troy.

But Korfmann does not work with a copy of the *Iliad* tucked under his arm. The three-month excavation operation just ended was conducted on a strictly scientific basis. Sixty-eight hours a week, 27 scientists from six countries worked under the blazing Turkish sun while 10 students from four universities washed and sorted the small ceramic potsherds.

The data were entered into a computer. A power shovel made the excavation work easier. And modern technology also made it possible to determine when Troy was first settled (Troy Zero): carbon-dating, which measures the extent to which radioactive carbon-14 has decayed, can now pinpoint the age of charcoal fragments. Korfmann obtained the unexpected C-14 data from the edge of a steeply sloped rock in the southern part of Schliemann's trench.

According to the data, Troy must have been inhabited as early as 3,500 B.C. Scholars had previously assumed that Troy I — dating from about 3,000 B.C. — was the oldest layer. The reason? Troy I was not built on the ruins of Troy Zero, but directly on the rocky ground, which had been cleared of remnants from Troy Zero.

So even though Schliemann had dug down to the rock, he was unable to discover remains of the original settlement, which lay buried under additional layers of debris on the steep slope of the hill. The find offers no clue as to how the people lived around 3,500 B.C., however. Nor does it indicate where they might have come from.

Korfmann's second significant discovery was also made using the most advanced geomagnetic measuring techniques. At a depth of between 1.5 and 2 metres outside the actual fortress of Troy, the acropolis, he came upon the ruins of Troy VI, the city said to be the scene of the Trojan War (13th century B.C.).

"That means we have only been aware of Troy's fortress," Korfmann said. If one adds the lower city - which must have been laid out according to a plan — then Homer's Troy is four times larger than had been previously supposed.

Korfmann debunks other myths as well. The legendary Trojan horse, in which Greek soldiers are said to have hidden in order to gain access to the city, which they then sacked, probably never existed. "Either the horse symbolised a battering ram or an earthquake brought down the walls," he surmises.


And the beautiful Helen was not the reason that Agamemnon, Achilles and all the other brave warriors fought for 10 years far from home. No, it was economics that "launched a thousand ships." At that time, whoever wanted to sail through the Dardanelles strait from the Aegean Sea had to stop at Troy because of the strong head winds and currents. Sometimes the ships were forced to wait weeks or even months for favourable winds.

The Trojans took advantage of their location by exacting payment. "The high tolls imposed on travellers made Troy *rich*," *Korfmann remarked*. This "gold mine," apart from the fishing grounds and copper deposits, was most likely behind the constant wars, destruction and reconstruction of the city.

The reason Troy suddenly lost its significance and fell into a long, deep sleep can also be explained: sailing technology changed, allowing ships to sail against the wind. Troy was then simply bypassed. Korfmann himself intends to remain true to Troy and dig on the banks of the Scamander into the next millennium. "We are at home here," he said. And you can believe him. He already speaks fluent Turkish.

Eckehart Rotter

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 6 September 1989)





The spirit of Homer, the ghosts of Troy . . . Korfmann at the site. (Photo: AP)

Riding easy with the Mongols: a culture in the saddle



Two shoemakers with the same materials can produce two pairs of quite dissimilar shoes. And so Arne Eggebrecht, the imaginative and ambitious director of the Römer und Pelizaeus Museum in Hildesheim, attracted art historians and journalists by saying that "his" Mongol exhibition would be different from the one shown this spring in Munich's Haus der Kunst even though the exhibits are essentially the same.

To get straight to the point: The trip to Hildesheim is worthwhile even for someone who has already seen the Munich exhibition. The city on the Isar was able to secure approximately 800 exhibits from the museums in Ulan Bator, the capital of the Mongolian People's Republic, enabling us to acquaint ourselves with a world we known little of.

Many of the artifacts are of recent origin, *however: magnificent garments* and utensils, made in the 19th and 20th centuries after the traditional fashion of handicraft, offer a more folkloristic picture of a culture still existing between Lake Baikal and China.

But the exhibition in Hildesheim is not confined to these predominantly ethnographic accents. Great importance is attached to illuminating the historical background necessary to understand the peculiarities and achievements of Mongolian culture.

This is accomplished not only with Eva Eggebrecht's absorbing half-hour audiovisual presentation and the didactically superb charts and diagrams, which do an excellent job of informing even those visitors reluctant to purchase the expensive catalogues; above all, it is achieved through the more than 100 additional exhibits gathered from museums and private collections in West Germany and abroad.

What many history books now dismiss with a few perfunctory lines under the catchword "Mongol hordes" was a source of terror for papal Rome and the royal courts of Eastern Europe during the late Middle Ages. The Mongols conquered Beijing in 1215 and subdued Moscow, Vladimir and Kiev between 1238 and 1240. The following year they defeated an army of Teutonic Knights near Liegnitz in Lower Silesia. *Other* Mongol hordes took Baghdad, *Aleppo* and Damascus; meanwhile, *parts of Persia*, India and Afghanis*tan submitted to* the Mongol yoke.

How could fewer than one million Mongols conquer about 25 million square kilometres of territory and reign over about the same number of people?

Many aspects of this central question are taken up in essays in a third volume of the catalogue, which Arne Eggebrecht brought out especially for the Hildesheim exhibition to go along with the two volumes borrowed from Munich. It gives us an idea of the military technology of this tightly organised nomadic people, which is just as fascinating as that of Alexander the Great's soldiers or of the Roman legions.

Mongolian culture in the narrow sense of the word was confined to the needs of a society constantly on the move with its horses, camels, cattle and sheep. It was not art that was needed, rather functional items of everyday use: practical clothing allowing women and children to ride as well, light gear and weapons, easily transportable tents and utensils.

The same was true of the ritual objects they carried with them. Their saddles and bridles were especially mas-

Continued on page 15



Persian victims, Mongol horsemen. Drawing circa 1,300 AD. (Photo: Catalogue)

■ FILM FESTIVALS

A political thriller with a less than blue-eyed outlook



In a film presented at this year's Biennial Film Festival in Venice German actor Götz George (who has a tough-guy image) speaks Spanish in a high-pitched voice, spitting out the syllables in a staccato style.

What initially seem rather odd is no more than logically consistent in terms of the customs of international festivals.

Wherever possible films are shown in the version in which they were produced.

This explains why, for example, everybody speaks English in Lina Wertmüller's Italian competition entry *On a moonlit night*, a tear-jerking and sensationalist film about the problem of Aids.

In an equally melodramatic Spanish film produced by Fernando Trueba (*The mad monkey*) nobody speaks Spanish.

Whereas in these two cases the choice of another language is based on production reasons alone, German director Reinhard Hauff has a content-related justification.

Hauff shot his film *Blauäugig* (blue-eyed, with the connotation of "naive" in German) in Argentina on the basis of a screenplay by Dorothee Schön, on a primarily Argentinian topic which soon becomes, figuratively speaking, universally valid.

Hauff admits that he had his doubts whether *he* would be able to do justice *to his* aim of presenting realistic cinema producing a film in a foreign country.

"But the language of injustice is the same the world over. And perhaps the detachment from experiences in my own country helps me see things even more clearly," says Hauff.

So the German festival entry in Venice *Blauäugig* had its premiere in Spanish, with a dubbed leading actor.

The film will be shown in the Federal Republic of Germany after 5 October.

Blauäugig is a political thriller, which uses the genre but moves much farther afield.

Cinema has gained a great deal if the audience can sense the horrors of the military junta, the omnipresent threat and the fear of those threatened without people begin clubbed or tortured in every second scene.

To a considerable extent the quality of the film reflects the quality of its screenplay, which opts for profundity rather than breadth with an elliptic narrative structure and deliberate omissions.

The Costa-Gavras film *Missing*, which automatically comes to mind when watching Hauff's latest production, was explicitly comprehensive in its enactment of the plot, a father searching for the child who had disappeared in the clutches of a military dictatorship.

Dorothee Schön and Reinhard Hauff describe the widespread conformism which, for the sake of peace and quiet, eventually turns into complicity.

"This is not a matter of yesterday or today," says Hauff, "since the film's central theme is that people ignore the threatening conditions around them until they are directly affected themselves."

Naive and intentionally blind to Argentinean reality around him in 1978 we find the German Johann Neudorf, whose original name was Hanus Novak and who was born in Czechoslovakia.

Only spared internment in a concentration camp on account of his blue eyes and blond hair, a victim who would not have fitted in with the Aryanisation programme of the Nazis, Novak was adopted by a German and emigrated to Argentina.

Neudorf then constructed an identity which allowed him to do profitable arms deals with the military junta.

His grown-up children, however, unexpectedly force him to stop living a lie and wake up to the events around him.

His daughter, who is well advanced in pregnancy, has a relationship with a member of a resistance group.

After her abduction she dies shortly after giving birth to the child.

Neudorf's son, a military academy graduate, can no longer reconcile his concern for the fate of his sister and his concern about his career as an officer.

Despite his initial resistance the father is forced to realise that his friends are not the sort of people he should really have as friends.

The child Hanus, who personally experienced the brutality of fascism but was able to suppress this experience because he was too young to really understand its significance, is no longer able to suppress the reality which faces him as the adult Johann.

In the end, after the film has moved into the year 1984, Johann Neudorf shoots the man who refused to give him his grandson. This cinematic concession is a finale without which the story, whose outcome remains open, would have been just as unusual. Hauff claims that Neudorf's action is not a symbolic subscription to the view that violence must be fought by violence. It is "the emotional act of a person in despair, his final, tragic rebellion against enormous injustice, which he alone cannot change and which he was unwilling to accept until it was too late."

Hauff did not presume to conclusively interpret the Argentinean situation.

Blauäugig is the story of a man whose eyes are opened as he stumbles forward until he cannot stand the pain of what he sees.

It is a film full of minor tragedies, most of which are only briefly touched on.

What a horrific scene, for example, as Neudorf is dragged into an interrogation cellar by a few thugs, identified as a German and then told that he must know then what concentration camps are.

Or the scene where, in a brief flashback, the adopted and now older child Johann alias Hanus is supposed to be handed back to his birth mother after the war, but flees in panic when he sees this now strange woman. In such moments Hauff's political thriller demonstrates how cleverly this genre can be used if handled properly.

Were it not for the superficial aesthetics and, above all, the symphonically surging music, which lacks mournful respect for the emotional thrust of the narrative.

Were it not for the dramatic weaknesses, such as the question why Neudorf's children no longer have a mother.

Were it not for these few objections Hauff's film would have been even more convincing than it is.

Nevertheless, it is one of the best at the Biennial Festival.

Hans-Dieter Seidel

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 11 September 1989)



New image for macho actor George. (Photo: Filmverlag der Autoren)

Looking back at the first decade

United we stand, divided we fall was the rallying motto of the documentary, experimental and feature film producers who organised the first Hamburg Film Festival in autumn 1979.

Ten years and many hours of screen showings later the original grass roots workshop has turned into a film office, the Low Budget Film Forum and the Hamburg Film Promotion Programme.

"The motto is still the same," says Torsten Teichert, who has been head of the film office since 1988.

The project took a critical look at its first decade of activity.

Among the various individual items were the following: a symposium on cultural film promotion; a special ball broadcast live by a number of TV channels; and a film review compiled by Helmut Herbst at the Metropolis cinema.

A catalogue outlines the difficulties involved in reaching agreement between the individualistic cineasts, lists the 272 films which were sponsored by roughly DM28m over the last ten years, and gives an account of how the idea was born.

Reinhard Hauff, one of the seven founder members in 1979, called for "more money combined with a new spirit: more films by young film-makers, more radical films and more experiments."

The first DM3m of the cultural Hamburg Film Sponsorship in 1980, of which DM2.5m found its way into film projects, were appropriated accordingly: 30 per cent for the "innovative" films and 70 per cent for feature films.

Avant-gardists such as Klaus Wyborny, Heinz Emigholz and Jean-Marie Straub translated the demands of feature film-maker Hauff into practice.

"Things have changed a bit today," says Torsten Teichert. "The feature film figure more prominently because we can grant DM6m each year. Our box office successes and film awards show that we are moving in the right direction: film by Hark Bohm, Jan Schütte, Tefvik Baser or Blumenberg's new Hans Albers film were financed by our money."

Support is not only for elitist goals, therefore, but also for the needs of the "mass audience."

This is all the more so since the Industrial Film Promotion set up in 1982, which also has DM6m at its disposal, has supported large-scale projects with a maximum DM500,000.

The requirement that the film-makers or the film location must be connected in some way with Hamburg, however, put an end to many ambitious plans.

"Making a film about Wackersdorf on the grounds that Hamburg is surrounded by nuclear power plants," Teichert explained, "was rejected by the committee."

Politicians and businessmen have long since realised something which Hamburg's former mayor, Hans-Ulrich Klose, denied in 1979: film sponsorship can make money.

Today the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce writes expert's reports on the effects of cultural and industrial promotion on the job market, on the willingness of businesses to set up their firms in Hamburg, and on the city's image.

Teichert admits, however, that Hamburg has not yet become Germany's major film city.

The former personal assistance to Hamburg's ex-mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi has an explanation:

"The pooling of resources by Studio Hamburg, the NDR broadcasting channel and film sponsorship did not take place."

An industrial film promoter who views his task as location policy must change the situation — a sideswipe at Teichert's predecessor in office, Dieter Kosslick, now manager of the Industrial Film Promotion Society and the extremely busy president of the European Distribution Promotion?

The Audit Office also complained in September 1988 about the doubling of costs caused by twin-tracking by film sponsors.

Councillor for cultural affairs Knut Nevermann is now working on a model of joining these two elements, although Teichert is not taken by the idea:

"If we continue fulfilling our cultural tasks, and the Industrial Film Promotion concentrates on its location policy approach, the distribution of tasks will be satisfactory."

Extension and transformation, therefore, instead of division.

After lengthy negotiations agreements have been drawn up on the old Zeise halls behind the Film House.

Next year a cinema, run by Hans-Joachim Flebbe, the Munich-based Prokino distributors or the Berlin-based Sputnik distributors, new technical rooms and a few shops will be set up in the building — perhaps to mark the eleventh anniversary.

Alexander Luckow

(Die Welt, Bonn, 7 September 1989)

■ BEHAVIOUR

Danger of misinterpreting restlessness in children as more than it is

The needs of children constantly clash with the expectations of adults.

The children's book *Struwwelpeter* written by Heinrich Hoffmann in 1845 was probably one of the most successful illustrations of this day-to-day conflict.

Hoffmann originally wrote the book and sketched the illustrations for his three-year-old son, but it was then reprinted many times and translated into many languages.

One of its stories, the story of Zappelphilipp (Philipp the fidget), describes a boy who keeps on rocking to and fro on his chair until the chair finally falls over backwards.

Reference is often made to this story as a classic description of a hyperkinetic child.

The hyperkinesia syndrome (HKS) consists of more than just the fidgety restlessness which "gets on the nerves" of Philipp's parents with their civilised table manners.

Apart from motor restlessness (hyperkinesia) the syndrome includes diminished attentiveness and high impulsivity.

A lack of self-esteem and disruptions in the social environment are frequently additional symptoms.

Unfortunately, the comparison with Hoffmann's character is only appropriate to a certain degree, since it can cause some parents to misinterpret their child's problem.

The number of parents who believe that their fidgety child might be "hyperkinetic" is increasing.

If they accept therapy without a reliable diagnosis they not only run the risk of moving along the wrong track, but also of damaging their child's health — for example, through restrictive diets or unnecessary medicine.

Scientists already estimate that 15 per cent of all boys suffer from the hyperkinesia syndrome.

The question is how many healthy fidgets are in this group? Or, in line with the critical considerations of education experts, how often is this disorder blamed to explain and to endure failure at school?

There are children whose restlessness must be viewed as a disorder and who must be treated accordingly.

There are a few main characteristic HKS symptoms.

According to Christoph Steinhausen from the Psychiatric Children's and Youth Clinic in Zurich these symptoms can be listed as follows:

- *Hyperactivity:* aimless activity, unable to sit still, constantly in movement, fidgety, considerable urge to keep on talking.
- *Diminished attentiveness:* only able to concentrate for short periods, lack of perseverance in work and play, rapid succession of different activities, easily distracted, does not listen properly to what others say.
- *Impulsivity:* unpredictable behaviour, inadequate control of behaviour at home and at school.

The expert for the diagnosis and therapeutic treatment of HKS also regards *excitability* and *irritability* as typical symptoms — symptoms reflected in tremendous emotional fluctuations and a proneness to disruptiveness.

In addition, there are *emotional problems,* which often find their expression in a lack of self-esteem and frequent crying, *dissocial behaviour* with an urge to destroy, argue, lie and be disobedient, and, finally, *learning problems,* which are reflected in a poor performance at school.

Symptoms from the second group generally occur if a fidgety and unattentive child is treated the wrong way over a longer period.

The Dusseldorf child and youth psychiatrist Reinhard Schydlo would like to see boys and girls screened before they go to school and to show their relatives how to deal with the problem of a strenuous child properly.

As chairman of the Professional Association of German Child and Youth Psychiatrists he advocates greater consideration of psychological problems during the planned medical check-up for children at the age of five, the ninth check-up after birth.

Paediatricians could single out the particularly problematic children before they go to school and refer them to specialist doctors.

Aggression, dissocial behaviour and other serious neurotic disorders often take time to develop and could thus be influenced at an earlier stage.

"The transitions from healthy to sick children, however, are fluid," says Schydlo.

This explains why the estimates of the number of children suffering from HKS vary from 2 to 15 per cent.

Experts are also at odds when it comes to the best form of treatment for HKS.

The fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding behavioural problems in infancy fits in with the overall picture.

An American study published at the end of the 1970s caused quite a stir at the time.

When parents, teachers and doctors were asked to state which pupils they regarded as disturbed each of the evaluating groups picked out roughly 13 per cent; agreement between the three groups, however, was only reached on 1.3 per cent of the children.

In most cases the problem remains undetected until the child goes to school, since the demands on concentration and staying quiet increase tremendously in this context.

A child of, say, three of four who responds to new stimuli with a pronounced urge to be active may be regarded as demanding, but not ill.

Experts today are convinced that standardised observation techniques can help determine which children need help with a substantial degree of certainty.

"Nevertheless, the HKS remains no more than an artifical support," Schydlo insists.

In all probability HKS is a catch-all expression for a variety of disorders.

The causes of conspicuous behaviour among children have not been fully researched, Scientists are still groping in the dark with respect to the causes, diagnosis and therapy.

- Organic influences on the central nervous system before, during or just after birth (such as the consumption of alcohol or drugs/tablets during pregnancy, the lack of oxygen at birth, previous infections or chronic lead poisoning) can cause minor damage and thus impair the function of the brain.
- Various studies indicate that genetic factors are codeterminant. They show that the children of persons suffering from hyperkinesia are also more prone to this disorder than other children; both children are more frequently hyperkinetic in the case of identical twins than in the case of non-identical twins.

Sex-specific differences are also attributed to hereditary factors. There are 4 hyperkinetic boys to every hyperkinetic girl.

The role played by environmental factors should also be considered here, since there has been a shift in this ratio in the USA to five boys to every girl.

- Reactions to food additives, such as colouring matter, preservatives, certain proteins, sugar and phosphate, may also be significant.

"The cases in which certain diets – for example, low-phosphate or oligoantigen diets — have been successful, however, are primarily due to the increased attention given to the child by the family," say Norbert Maus and Volker Pudel from the Nutrition Physiology Research Centre at the University of Göttingen in a résumé of the centre's studies.

There is general agreement, the Göttingen scientists claim, that nutrients influence behaviour and mental state.

To enable the transmission of impulses from one nerve cell to another in the central nervous system to function by transmitter substances the basic components of these substances — such as the amino acid tryptophane — must be absorbed through adequate nutrition, the blood-cerebral barrier overcome and the substances passed on to the synthesis locations of the brain. The authors stress, however, that it is too early to make any inferences on general nutritional recommendations at this stage.

As the spectrum of causal and triggering factors is so great parents should take children who are excessively restless or lack concentration along to the centres for child and youth psychiatry, the Zürich expert Christoph Steinhausen recommends.

As a rule, there is a whole set of problems which has to be treated.

Critics fear that rowdies, scatterbrains and other "trouble-makers" may be sent along to doctors or psychologists because they have been branded as hyperkinetic.

In his book *Pillen für den Störenfried* (Pills for the Trouble-Maker) Reinhard Voss already warned against this development in 1983.

Parents, teachers, doctors and psychologists must ask themselves "whether they want to help create a situation in which deviant behaviour is defined as a disorder and thus turned into an area of medical responsibility."

Voss was particularly critical of the "growing emphasis on allegedly organic causes . . . and a corresponding neglect of social and sociopsychological factors of origin."

Psychologist Burkhard Brocke from the Free University of Berlin, who examined the behavioural problems of 1,100 children, would like to see such psychogenic factors taken into account more often:

"Various studies indicate that these factors are particularly significant for a subpopulation of hyperkinetic children."

These children do not reveal organic damage or reactions to nutrients, but are "characterised by a marked emotional instability and at the same time suffer tremendously because particularly

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■ FRONTIERS

A tale of two cities, two nations, two families and two deaths

What began 17 years ago as one of the usual stories of an East-West relationship and ended with the death of two people is still a nightmare for pensioner Carl Hübner from East Berlin (all names in this article have been changed).

He lost a daughter and a grandson, and is convinced that they would still be alive today were it not for the fact that Germany is a divided country.

It all began as a love affair. He was from the West, she was from the East.

If he had come from Schwerin and she had come from Weimar (or she had lived in Essen and he had lived in Duisburg) *they may* not have even fallen in love.

"Bärbel would have probably never noticed Harald," says Hübner. "He was not particularly good-looking. He was not striking in any way."

Harald, a 25-year-old cook who had been retrained as a social worker, had been in and out of children's homes. He had had no father. Now he was married and living in West Berlin. His wife was expecting a baby.

As a member of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) he travelled to East Berlin to attend the May Day celebrations in 1972.

There, he got to know 18-year-old Bärbel, an only child who had had a sheltered upbringing. Her parents were both academics.

Bärbel was a student at an advertising *institute*. Harald and Bärbel fell in love.

Perhaps Bärbel felt that he was something exotic because he had seen a lot of the world as a cook. He had been to Iraq and to Switzerland.

It was the kind of attraction which often drew East German women to men from the West. Maybe the men embodied something unattainable for them.

The men in question are more than happy to let themselves be treated like a modern-day fairytale prince.

Bärbel's fairytale prince travelled from West to East for a whole year, bringing her little presents.

Their farewells made both hearts grow fonder and Harald finally decided to get a divorce from his wife.

Contrary to the normal course of such love affairs, however, Bärbel did *not* go to live with Harald in the West. He went to live in the East.

They married and managed to get a place to live in the suburb of Prenzlauer Berg.

To begin with Harald stayed in the catering trade and then worked as an orderly in a hospital.

Bärbel duly gave birth to a baby boy, *Julius,* who was often taken along to visit his grandparents, Carl Hübner and his wife. The happy facade, however, soon started to crumble.

Harald had hoped that life would be a bit better than it was in East Germany. He became unhappy.

In Bärbel's eyes he increasingly lost the aura of someone special. The couple quarrelled more and more frequently. Bärbel decided to seek a divorce.

Then somehow they patched things up. Their reconciliation was helped by a new aim in life which was again connected with the division of Germany: they made an application to be allowed to be united with Harald's mother in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bärbel looked forward to the West.



Harald again had that special appeal.

Their son Julius was three when they were allowed to leave the GDR. Their departure was a shock for Bärbel's parents.

The move to the south of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, only improved the marriage for a short while.

Right from the start Bärbel could not get on with her mother-in-law.

Harald was unemployed for a long time. Difficulties arose which made it impossible for Harald and Bärbel to stay together.

Bärbel and her son moved to another town, began teacher training and worked at the same time as a waitress.

Harald followed her and she decided to give him another chance. After the next big row they got a divorce.

Harald was still unemployed and had nowhere to live. Bärbel lost all her courage and said that she wanted to go back to East Germany. Harald was panic-stricken. He adored his son and must have felt that he would lose him altogether if Bärbel returned to the East.

The tragedy took its course. On the night before Harald was supposed to move out of the shared flat he smashed his wife's skull with a fieldstone, wrapped the corpse in a plastic sheet, and bundled it into a wall cupboard in the hall.

He told his five-year-old son Julius next morning that his mother had to travel to East Berlin because her father was ill.

As Bärbel had told her fellow students that she was afraid her husband might do something to her, a few days later they reported her missing.

Her body was found, Harald was arrested and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for manslaughter.

It was then that the struggle for the child began, the next act in this intra-German drama. To begin with Julius was taken to a home.

His grandparents from East Berlin wanted to be given custody of the child so as to take him away from his violent father.

The West German grandmother refused to let this happen.

During the first hearing in the district court, the East Berlin lawyer, Wolfgang Vogel, who acted for the Hübners, brought along someone from the Bonn Ministry for Intra-German Relations to confirm that experience had shown that Vogel keeps his promises.

This precautionary measure can only, yet again, be understood against the background of the special problems which exist between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The man from Bonn went even further by advocating that the boy should live with his grandparents in East Berlin. A local government official took up this remark and complained that it represented an interference in a pending lawsuit.

There was an inquiry in the Bundestag: yet another intra-German dispute. The district court then awarded custody of the child to its West German grandmother.

The Hübners successfully appealed against the decision.

The West German grandmother appealed against this decision and this time the Higher Regional Court said that she was in the right.

Carl Hübner is embittered when he recalls what happened: "The tenor in the courts was always: the boy would be estranged from his father by his grandparents in East Berlin. Once the child is behind the Iron Curtain he would lose his father and his freedom."

The trials dragged on. The district court at least allowed the grandparents from East Berlin to visit Julius once a fortnight.

At that time every GDR citizen visting the West was given only DM10 per day by the East German authorities.

It was a long way for the Hübners from East Berlin to the south of the Federal Republic. They had to spend the night somewhere along the way.

"We took along sandwiches, milk, everything we needed, and stayed overnight in a small guest-house," Hübner recalls.

They were able to see their grandson for four hours: "Once we took him to the Christmas fair. His grandmother insisted that we did not see him alone, probably because she was afraid we might kidnap him.

"So a sister came along with a group of children from the children's home. We bought a bit of candy floss for all of them.

"Then the sister kindly took the other children a bit further away so that we could go on the merry-go-round with Julius. We just could not afford that for all the children."

Somehow they always managed to go for a meal with the boy. "And we just had to buy an ice-cream or a piece of cake."

The court had also allowed Hübners to talk with their grandson over the phone once a month.

His West German grandmother, however, with whom the child was now living, claimed that she was being pestered by anonymous phone-calls and had the phone disconnected.

The Hübners insisted that Julius be brought along to the local priest's office so that they could ring him there.

The letters, phone-calls and brief meetings, however, could not prevent an estrangement between Julius and his grandparents from East Berlin. The West German grandmother inluenced the child to a growing extent.

"It was increasingly difficult to break through his reserve. It was degrading and depressing."

The Hübners travelled less often to southern Germany and, in the end, they stopped their visits altogether, only writing to and ringing up their grandson.

And then suddenly, in 1987, the boy's West German grandmother told the Hübners on the phone that Julius wanted to visit them in East Berlin.

It was as if the years and years of quarrels and estrangement had been swept away.

Julius, now 15, came to East Berlin during his summer holidays in 1988.

"For four weeks we tried to make sure that he had a really good holiday. He went down to see the big Bruce Springsteen concert, for example. That was what he enjoyed most," says Hübner.

He describes how the sight of the photographs of his mother initially came as a shock to Julius. He just did not want to see them.

He only flicked through the photo albums and asked questions later on.

According to his teachers in the Rudolf Steiner school he was completely changed when he came back from his holidays.

Whereas he used to disrupt lessons and was unable to concentrate properly before he was now a zealous pupil.

The teacher's remarks were written in an obituary. Julius died exactly one month after he returned from East Berlin.

Officially, it was an accident. He used the hair-dryer while he was in the bath.

His grandparetns in East Berlin just cannot believe it. They feel that is was not an accident.

After all, they say, he never used the hair-dryer to dry his hair when he was in East Berlin. As he had natural curly hair it would not have been necessary anyway.

But what was it then? Suicide? Because he could not cope with his personal history? There will never be a clear answer. The tragedy did not stop there.

The boy's West German grandmother gave his corpse to an anatomical insitute in the Federal Republic of Germany for study purposes.

His grandparents in East Berlin objected and the understanding head of the institute had the dead boy cremated and sent the urn to his grandparents in East Berlin.

The urn now lies buried in a cemetery in East Berlin, next to the urn of his mother.

Marlies Menge

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 8 September 1989)

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posed to the strains of their environment — such as failure at school or the loss of a close relative due to divorce or death."

Behavioural therapies are aimed at making it easier for the infant patients to control their activities and helping parents to deal with their problematic child. Uncomplicated means are often more effective.

Australian youth psychiatrists Christopher Green and Brent Waters say:

- The environment of the child at school and at home should be organised in such a way that its life is properly structured in accordance with a routine.
- Always talk to the child in such a way as to hold its attention: use its name often, keep eye-to-eye contact and use simple language.
- Support the child's generally weak self-confidence by making successes possible and then praising it. Emphasise the child's strong points.
- The parents need support, since they are faced by a multiple strain: the demands of their child, the differing schools of thought of the experts, and the accusations of blame by neighbours, friends or doctors. The question raised by many educationalists should also be considered. Is the discrepancy between the needs of the child and the demands of its environment so big that this in itself is the problem? Does a fidgety child first become a hyperkinetic after going to school?

Those who are not so keen on the principles of child upbringing advocated in the last century should read *Der Anti-Struwwelpeter* by Friedrich Karl Waechter.

Instead of the boy falling over with his chair it is the angry father who takes a tumble after insisting that his well-fed son eats up the soup the father does not like.

Elke Brüser

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 7 September 1989)

■ SPORT

A Graf victory by inches — and by miles

Martina Navratilova couldn't resist. Just a few moments after she had lost the final of the American open at New York's Flushing Meadow, she threw out a challenge: "Today, just a few points decided the match. But I'm going to keep going until I win those points back."

The 20,000 spectators jammed into the arena roared their loud approval of the 32-year-old's unfailing grit. The former best woman player in the world had lost to Steffi Graf 3-6, 7-5, 6-1. It was the third time in a Grand Slam tournament in the past two years that she had slumped to 1-6 in the third and deciding set against Steffi Graf — the other two were the last two Wimbledon finals.

Navratilova once again had played superbly. Once again, she lost her nerve at a crucial moment. She was one set up and leading 4-3 in the second (after having gone ahead 4-2 with a service break) when she served two double faults. She dropped the set 5-7. In the third set, she crumbled to the Graf fireworks.

The muscular loser kept up the verbal broadsides afterwards: "I'm not discouraged, because I know I can beat Steffi. I can beat everyone and win another Grand Slam tournament."

But the brashness does not measure up to the facts of the past two years: Graf has won seven of the past eight Grand Slam tournaments. Only her loss in Paris this year to Arantxa Sanchez prevented her second successive Grand Slam — which comprises the Australian Open in Melbourne, the French in Paris, the Wimbledon and the American.

But it is not just a matter of looking back over the past two years. Even more, an analysis of the 110 minutes the two spent on that boiling Saturday afternoon on the Stadium Court at Flushing Meadow must be enough to belie Navratilova's belief in herself.

Certainly, at one stage she was leading 6-3 and 4-2 and demonstrating the full range of her ability. She was dominating with strong serves and volleys. Victory beckoned. But at the decisive moment, she could not finish it off. She almost handed the game to Graf on a silver plate. The two double faults in the eighth game of the set were the first of the entire match. Graf came back to 4-all.

Afterwards Navratilova wanted to play it down as a matter of mere misjudgment. "It was a game of inches," she said. "She hit so many lines and I missed two or three shots by inches." Her double-fault serves had, after all, only been just out by inches. Neither nerves nor fatigue had been factors.

Every tennis player knows that the only shot in the game over which the opponent has no influence at all is the service. It is the only shot which can be repeated if the first is unsuccessful. Yet, at crucial stages, it is a shot which puts the toughest of nerves to the test.

Graf, the winner, showed how. As defeat stared her in the eyes, she started to serve even better. At 4-4, and facing was was to be the last break point against her, her nerves held and she passed the test with flying colours.

That was the point when Steffi Graf was able to reject any doubt in her own mind. Steffi said afterwards she was able to go to the net at the decisive moment, which made it still more difficult for the American. Indeed, it was conspicuous how pugnaciously Graf was able to storm the net in tight situations and deliver telling serves when they were most needed.

At no stage had she had thoughts about losing — in contrast to the semifinal against the Argentinian, Gabriela Sabatini. She was leading 3-0 in the third set when she got cramp. On her own admission, thoughts of defeat did swirl through her head. The heat had taken its toll. Dehydration had set in as it had to Jay Berger and Jimmy Connors earlier. But she rescued herself from an awkward situation and ran out the winner 3-6, 6-4, 6-2.

She completed the job with a somewhat lucky stop volley on her first match ball. Then she threw her hands to her face and ran, crying with pain, from the court. The following day she admitted: "If I hadn't taken that point, I would probably not have won."

The match against Navratilova was by contrast, one in which Graf played throughout with utter confidence. She had recovered from cramp and, before the match, had been twice massaged. When the American got the upper hand, the German girl simply thought to herself: "She can't keep playing like this." And she couldn't. Graf began to play



too well to allow it. Her superior return of service took the edge off Navratilova's biggest weapon, her service.

From then on, the duel was one-sided. Navratilova said: "When she gets going, she is difficult to stop." So how does she intend to do the stopping? "I'll have to improve my service so that it doesn't fall me at crucial times."

That is easier said than done. Next month, she will be 33. Graf has just turned 20. The likelihood is that the gap between the two will increase rather than diminish.

Navratilova: "I'll have to get her on a day when she's not serving like a madman. But maybe that day won't occur. I've got to do something. I want to beat her somehow."

A win over Steffi Graf as an obsession. But not even Martina Navratilova can say how events will turn out.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 11 September 1989)



Looked defeat in the eyes ... Graf.



High Noon at siesta time ... Becker.

(Photos: dpa)

Boris Becker and Steffi Graf have completed a second German tennis Grand Slam double in less than three months. They won their respective singles titles at Wimbledon in June and now have repeated the dose in the American Open at New York's Flushing Meadow. Graf beat Martina Navratilova in her final, 3-6, 7-5, 6-1, to take her second US Open and her eighth Grand Slam event. Becker, a long way from his favourite grass surface at Wimbledon, showed a new maturity in beating Ivan Lendl in the final 7-6, 1-6, 6-3, 7-6. Becker's achievement in adapting to the slower cement surface means that he has won two successive Grand Slam tournaments, something only Rod Laver (1969), John McEnroe (1981, 1984) and Jimmy Connors (1974, 1982) have achieved since tennis became open. The tournament was played in extreme heat, with temperatures inside the stadium reaching 110 degrees Fahrenheit (about 43 Celsius). Jörg Stratmann reports on Boris Becker for *Die Welt*; the Graf report appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Becker graduates from grass to the meadows of cement

The winner leaned back, closed his eyes and tried, without success, to sort out in his mind the arduous events of the past 14 days.

"Unbelievable," observed Boris Becker. His win over Ivan Lendl, the world number one, in the final of the American Open in New York was still beyond his comprehension. It was his first Grand Slam title apart from Wimbledon — which means his first not on the fast grass surface he likes.

He says he played at close to the limits of his capabilities. He played seven long, grinding matches which he found even more exhausting than the drawn-out matches on the clay surface of Paris.

So has he now played himself substantially closer to being number one in the world? Becker: "The computer says no." And that despite the fact, says Becker, that he and Lendl are playing near enough to the same standard.

The computer still sees a difference between them, but the statistics of the matches between them only serve to underscore uncannily how evenly matched they are.


They have met 14 times. Both have won seven. Although Becker won here at Flushing Meadow, both hit 11 aces in the match and made five double faults; and both won 134 points. In the evenly matched Masters tournament last year. Becker won after five long sets, but won just one point more than Lendl.

Becker: "Ivan is only steadier than me.

Lendl: "Boris' game has more power than mine. But over the year, we have cleared out from the field."

There were 20,000 spectators to watch this final. They had been waiting in the heat for a Showdown. And that is what they got. It was a relentless display in which mental factors triumphed over playing skills. They began by circling like two heavyweight boxers with massive respect for the thumping power of the other. They needed 17 minutes for the first two games and it took an hour for Becker to take the first set, 7-6.

Neither was able to reach the heights of their clash at the Masters; perhaps the tension here was just too much for that. Both were playing with such maddening coolness that the atmosphere in the stands never reached any great le-



vels. Lendl kept dragging out his preparatory ritual until the last permissible second. Becker avoided running for every ball in the blast-furnace heat of the centre court. He limited himself to going for the decisive games and the crunch points. Between points, he moved like a Mexican peasant at the height of the siesta. Languid. Slow. Saving energy was the name of his game.

But at the same time neither let anyone forget just what power and precision can be delivered in the game at this level.

Lendl, at full stretch, used both backhands and forehands to turn some of Becker's best volleys into line-hugging winners. On the other hand, Becker dominated the brutally hard baseline duels, which is usually Lendl's domain.

And Becker served brilliantly when it counted most. Becker: "You know inside yourself beforehand if a serve is going to be a good one." With this self confidence, he ended the match with an ace and with another serve which Lendl could reach only with his racket frame.

Becker rated his game this way: it fluctuated one the scale between one and 10. When it came to mental factors, the rating was always 10.

And that is the most decisive change in the game of Boris Becker. His appearances over the entire year, culminating in the tournament here, have been marked by incredible emotional stability. So much so that he has developed a reputation of being able to step on the gas in apparently hopeless situations.

He succeeded in fundamentally altering his attitude to cope with the din and the hectic ambience at Flushing Meadow.

Becker: "I hated playing here and I knew I had to learn to like it if I was ever to win here."


Trainer Bob Brett was the main factor behind the change. "He got me to work harder. He taught me what tennis really is about."

No one is happier about the impressive way this change brought success than the slim Australian himself.

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■ FRANKFURT GARDEN SHOW

Blooming fuss + babbling brook = a public flop



Unspoilt nature, the country garden and the babbling brook are all to be found amid the gorgeous floral displays at the *Bundesgartenschau*, or Federal Garden Show, in Frankfurt.

Everything, in fact, but the sound of visitors clicking through the turnstiles. The show is likely to be a financial flop.

The organisers invested DM105m in a show they claimed would bring visitors out in full bloom. It hasn't.

With six weeks to go to the end of the season, a mere three million visitors have turned up. Eight million were expected.

Even if the final total were four million, it would have been the worst turnout in 30 years.

Since the first *Bundesgartenschau*, held in Hanover in 1951 and seen by 1.6 million visitors, only one show has failed to top four million.

It was Kassel in 1955, where 2.9 million visitors passed through the turnstiles.

Yet this year's show is one of the most unusual of the 20 since the war. It has been the first to limit exhibition space to a mere 10 per cent of the grounds.

The remainder consists of unspoilt nature: woods, meadows and wetlands.

What is more, the show will is strictly ephemeral. Once it is over, nothing but countryside will remain, with nothing to *remind* people of the flower beds and the set pieces.

This concept was the result of years of political squabbles. It dates back to a campaign associated with the 1981 show, held in Kassel, and not with this year's show at all.

In Kassel conservationists, artists and university teachers complained that unspoilt nature in the Fulda meadows, site of the 1981 show, was being "gardened" to death.

Eight years later, in Frankfurt, this carping criticism was voiced so loud that the entire show seemed likely to be stymied at one stage.

A staggering variety of alliances were forged to attack the city council in a pincer-movement.

Ecologists joined forces with allotment-holders, who were worried they might forfeit their urban vegetable gardens.

Sports clubs were worried their grounds and clubhouses might be compulsorily purchased to make way for the *Bundesgartenschau*.

Dropouts were worried their patch of woodland might be felled. Residents of neighbouring Römerstadt and Hausen were reluctant to share, let alone to lose, their peace and quiet.

They all set out to thwart the show, or at least to cut it down to size, to "ecologise" it.

Ecological reasons were not the main consideration. The area earmarked for the show was a legal no-man's-land put to a variety of uses.

The erstwhile flood plain of the Nidda, it was designated in 1914 as a park-to-be. But then came the First World War, and in 1927 the river was canalised.

The area was taken over by gardeners and sports clubs, farmers and a small zoo, even a US forces radio transmitter.

What was originally intended to be a recreation area for the general public was criss-crossed by fences, hedges and footpaths.

The city council intended from the outset to hold the *Bundesgartenschau* there to reclaim an area taken over by private, anarchic users for the use of the general public.

It might have worked if only the show's opponents had not enlisted the support of environmentalists and the then Opposition parties in the city council, the Social Democrats and the Greens.

The SPD and the Greens naturally saw the *Bundesgartenschau* less as a means of torturing Mother Nature than of pillorying the city's CDU mayor.

So the interests of the previous users were given a quick coat of environment-friendly green paint and the ecologists staked their claim to the site.

Faced by this attack on two fronts, the city and the *Bundesgartenschau* organisers chose to beat an orderly retreat.

The area said to be required was first reduced from 168 to 90 hectares, making the remainder available for previous use as a public park. Then most of the 13 hectares of allotment gardens was legalised, as was 12 hectares of sports grounds and land used for commercial purposes.

Then the entire *Bundesgartenschau* concept was given an ecological imprint. The emphasis was to be on wild shrubs and perennials, on orchards and woodland rather than on flower beds.

All buildings and furniture except for a handful of benches was to be designed for disassembly and easy removal.

As a matter of policy, parking lots were not provided. Instead, a fleet of buses was laid on to ferry visitors to and from the city centre.

These buses had as a special attraction a technical innovation. The driver could set traffic lights by remote control to enable the bus to cruise through green lights at a steady speed.

But 30 of the 40 buses specially bought (at DM390,000 each) have been withdrawn. There hasn't been enough demand for them. Concessions to the environment (and its supporters) have lost the *Bundesgartenschau* money hand over fist.

The ecological extras are what seems to have been to blame for the flop. The general public simply weren't keen on them.

There are, for instance, footpaths that come to a sudden end at the fence marking the perimeter of the show, the rest having been declared surplus to requirements and scheduled as a public park.

There are the allotment gardens fenced off in the middle of the show, their owners brazenly driving through to gardens where gigantic vegetables surely testify to a liberal use of artificial fertilisers.

There are the *Bundesgartenschau* buildings, tucked away behind blinds and flower beds and marquees but all looking decidedly makeshift and haphazard.

There is the still water of the artificial brook where water was not, after litigation, allowed to run and is now overgrown by weeds. Above all, there are the "natural" and "back-to-nature" woods and meadows that make up 90 per cent of the show's surface area.

Despite signposts and a lavishly illustrated, well-written catalogue, visitors fail to identify them as part of the show. Some say it is too extensive. What they mean is that the 20km of footpaths round the new public park is too much for them.

Others say touring the site by narrow-gauge railway is too boring. "You'd think there'd be something to see," says an irate, well-built lady from the countryside. "They'd do better to run the train twice round the flower beds."

Her complaint is understandable. For people from rural areas the sight of natural meadows and woodland is nothing unusual; for environmentalists who live in high-rise apartment blocks they are a welcome achievement.

But environmentalists wouldn't visit the *Bundesgartenschau* in any case.

"I'm not going to pay to look at something so manipulated," says a young woman in the neighbouring beer garden. Visitors, eating spare ribs and drinking beer, look thoroughly ashamed of themselves.

The Frankfurt show really doesn't deserve such criticism. It has 43,000 square metres (nearly 11 acres) of flower beds, 8,000 square metres (two acres) of indoor shows and 5,000 square metres each of cemetery arrangements and rose show.

It also features 70,000 square metres (17.5 acres) of gardens, including domestic and rooftop gardens, a "garden of the senses," a volcanic garden, a garden of mirrors, an assortment of gardens with ponds and highly artistic (and highly abstract) "character gardens" based on paintings by Hieronymus Bosch, Vassily Kandinsky and Max Peintner.

"Even the most fortunate landscape can be aesthetically embellished and economically improved by judicious use of the gardener's art," said gardener Peter Joseph Lenné, whose birth bicentenary is on 29 September.

The Frankfurt *Bundesgartenschau* seems to show that this advice is nowadays widely felt to be inappropriate.

What a pity, given the idealism gardeners have invested in the Frankfurt show. What a pity that ecology has been so misguided.

Dankwart Guratzsch

(Die Welt, Bonn, 5 September 1989)



A fine row to hoe. The Frankfurt Garden Show.

(Photo: dpa)

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terly, reflecting a lifestyle in which everything revolved around their horses.

Mongolian art, on the other hand, seems to have always been influenced by the countries the Tatars conquered. Chinese drawings, Persian miniatures, Indian cloth paintings and small Tibetan sculptures are evidence of how the nomads' notions of art intermingled with those of the peoples they subjugated.

Marco Polo brought back early knowledge of the Mongols' ancestral lands from his travels at the end of the 13th century. The Francisoan friar Plano Carpini had set out for Mongolia 50 years earlier, however.

Before that, he founded the Franciscan monastery in Hildesheim together with St. Martin's Church, which, having been secularized, now serves as an exhibition hall. Thus, the products of Mongolian culture have travelled to the place where their first European discoverer once worked.

Ivo Frenzel

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 7 September 1989)

Becker lowers Lendl

Continued from page 14

As Becker got ready for the victory ceremony, this normally reserved man stood nervously in the grandstand, a grin of triumph playing across his face.

Then he hurried to the nearest telephone and put a call through to his wife in Switzerland and reported the success. As he did so, he hopped from one leg to the other.

Then he happened to see Boris Becker's father passing. He went and embraced him, lifting the corpulent Herr Becker into the air and saying: "Can you believe it? Boris played badly the whole tournament and he's beaten Lendl!"

Unbelievable but true. Becker produced the evidence that, on a surface that demands perfection from a player, he can beat the best.

Jörg Stratmann

(Die Welt, Bonn, 12 September 1989)